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The “New Open Economy Macroeconomics” argues 
that: (a) non-monetary factors have gained importance 
in explaining exchange rate volatility, and (b) trade 
and financial openness may have a potential role of 
mitigating and/or amplifying real and nominal shocks 
to real exchange rates. The goal of the present paper is 
to examine the ability of trade and financial openness 
to exacerbate or mitigate real exchange rate volatility. 
The authors collected information on the real effective 
exchange rate, its fundamentals, and (outcome and policy 
measures of) trade and financial openness for a sample 
of industrial and developing countries for the period 
1975-2005. Using instrumental variables techniques, the 
analysis finds that: (a) High real exchange rate volatility 
is the result of highly volatile productivity shocks, and 
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sharp oscillations in monetary and fiscal policy shocks. 
(b) Countries more integrated with international markets 
of goods and services tend to display more stable real 
exchange rate fluctuations. (c) Financial openness seems 
to amplify the fluctuations in real exchange rates. (d) 
The composition of trade and capital flows plays a 
role in explaining the smoothing properties of trade 
and financial openness. Although the former is mainly 
driven by manufacturing trade, the latter depends on 
the share of debt (and equity) in total foreign liabilities. 
(e) Financial openness would attenuate (magnify) real 
exchange rate volatility, the greater the share of equity 
(debt) in foreign liabilities. (f) The composition of flows 
also matters for explaining the smoothing properties of 
trade and financial openness in periods of currency crisis. 
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After the collapse of the gold standard in 1971, industrial economies were forced to 
switch from fixed exchange rates to floating systems. This switch brought a larger volatility 
for both the nominal and the real exchange rate (RER) (Stockman, 1983; Mussa, 1986).  
During the 1970s, the monetary authorities were blamed for the greater RER volatility as 
Dornbusch (1976) showed that unanticipated monetary policy shocks were able to generate 
disproportionately large fluctuations in the exchange rates (overshooting effect).
1 However, 
the hypothesis that monetary stability was the sole culprit of exchange rate instability lost 
ground as most industrial economies have stabilized inflation at annual rates below 3 
percent. For example, inflation rates have converged to the 1 to 2 percent range in the U.S., 
Japan, and Europe; whereas the exchange rates across the US dollar, the euro, and the yen 
are still significantly volatile (Rogoff, 1999). The fact that exchange rate volatility among 
the major currencies has not declined in spite of the successful efforts to bring inflation 
down, allows us to think that the role of monetary factors implied by Dornbusch (1976) 
was overstated. Furthermore, the inability of monetary models to replicate and forecast 
exchange rate fluctuations (Meese and Rogoff, 1983) implies that monetary instability is 
only one of the several factors driving exchange rate volatility. 
A recent strand of the literature, the so-called “New Open Economy Macroeconomics”, 
argues that: First, non-monetary factors have gained importance in explaining exchange 
rate volatility. That is, in addition to monetary shocks, we should include productivity 
shocks, goods demand shocks (say, government spending shifts), and labor supply shocks, 
among others. Second, openness to world markets of goods and assets may play a role in 
either smoothing out or amplifying the impact of shocks to real effective exchange rates. 
The literature shows that, by allowing greater flexibility in aggregate price adjustment, trade 
openness limits the impact of either nominal or real shocks on the volatility of real 
exchange fluctuations (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995, 1996; Hau, 2000, 2002). On the other 
hand, financial openness (through the reduction of frictions in the flow of capital across 
countries) tends to amplify the volatility of RER in the presence of nominal shocks and 
mitigate the oscillations in real exchange rates in the event of real shocks (Sutherland, 
1996). 
 
                                                           
1 According to Dornbusch, the lower speed of adjustment in the goods markets (relative to financial markets) 
was the mechanism through which the exchange rate disproportionately absorbed the unanticipated monetary 
shock in the short run. 
  2In order to analyze our econometric results with some structural interpretation, we use 
a dynamic general equilibrium model of exchange rate dynamics as a theoretical 
background. This model follows in spirit the ones formulated by Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(1995, 1996) and Hau (2000, 2002). Spefically, we follow a modified version of the redux 
model that includes the government sector (Calderon, 2004). We should point out that we 
do not test the model directly, but we use econometric techniques to test some of the 
implications of the model.  
The goal of this paper is two-fold. First, test the relationship between RER volatility 
and openness for a panel data of countries. We evaluate whether the data confirms the 
implications on the relationship between: (a) RER volatility and trade openness as implied 
by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), Hau (2002) and Calderon (2004); and, (b) RER volatility 
and financial openness as derived by Sutherland (1996). We simply assess whether RER 
volatility declines if the country is more integrated to international markets of goods and 
capital. Second, we test whether the composition of trade flows as well as capital flows may 
play a role in explaining the smoothing properties of trade and financial openness. Does 
trade openness help to smooth shocks to the RER in countries with concentrated output 
structures? Does financial openness help to smooth or to amplify shocks to the RER in 
countries with different structures of capital flows and external liabilities? Accounting for 
the composition of flows would be crucial, especially in the case of financial openness 
when the ability to mitigate or to magnify the volatility of RER depends on the nature of 
the shocks facing the economy. This conjecture is consistent with Sutherland (1996), who 
shows that financial openness would mitigate (magnify) the volatility of RER fluctuations 
in the presence of unanticipated real (nominal) shocks. 
To perform this task, we collect information on exchange rates, labor productivity in 
the Home and Foreign country, terms of trade, government spending, monetary 
aggregates, exchange rate regimes, as well as trade and financial openness for a sample of 
82 countries (of which 22 are industrial countries) for the period 1975-2005. We will use 
both least squares and instrumental methods for panel data model. To instrument for trade 
openness, we follow the strategy developed by Frankel and Romer (1999) of calculating the 
geographic component of trade openness from the gravity model of bilateral trade. On the 
other hand, we select the appropriate instrument for financial openness and the structure 
of external capital following Faria and Mauro (2004) and Faria, Mauro, Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2006). 
  3Understanding the factors determining RER volatility and the role of openness in 
either mitigating or amplifying the shocks to real exchange rates is crucial due to the effects 
of the variability of RERs on economic performance. Aghion et al. (2006) show 
theoretically and empirically that rising exchange rate volatility can hamper growth, 
especially in countries with shallow financial markets and macroeconomic volatility is 
mainly driven by financial shocks. The negative impact of the RER volatility on growth can 
be transmitted through declining investment (Servén, 1998; Bleany and Greenaway, 2001) 
and by lower foreign trade —particularly in differentiated products (Broda and Romalis, 
2003). This paper also relates to the literature that investigates the role of RERs as shock 
absorbers. Although more flexible exchange arrangements have greater ability to mitigate 
the impact of real shocks (say, terms of trade shocks) on economic performance —
especially, negative terms of trade shocks (Broda, 2004; Edwards and Levy-Yeyati, 2005),  
this line of research goes beyond our scope. 
Our paper complements existing evidence that higher trade and financial linkages 
between debtor and creditor countries would render a lower volatility of the bilateral 
exchange rate of the debtor country vis-a-vis its creditor (Dereveux and Lane, 2003). In 
general, deeper trade linkages between two countries would dampen their real exchange 
rate volatility and may encourage them to join a currency union (Broda and Romalis, 2003). 
It also complements evidence on the role of openness in mitigating or amplifying the 
impact of real shocks in the economy. For instance, Calderón, Loayza and Schmidt-Hebbel 
(2005) find that trade openness tend to amplify the impact of terms of trade shocks on 
output volatility while financial openness seem to attenuate the impact of trade and 
financial shocks. Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2006) use data at the industry level to show 
that trade leads to deeper specialization and increasing output volatility in more outward-
oriented industries. Finally, Buch et al. (2006) use the firm-level data in Germany to show 
that rising trade openness affects the volatility of firm’s output by modifying the exposure 
to shocks as well as the response of firms with the net effect being ambiguous.  
In addition, our paper improves upon the evidence presented by Hau (2002) in the 
following dimensions: first, it presents evidence for a larger sample of countries (82) and 
sample period (1975-2005).
2 Second, we present panel data evidence (instead of cross-
section). We work with 5-year period observations on the volatility of RER such as 
openness and fundamentals. Third, we instrument for trade and financial openness using 
external instruments recommended by recent existing literature. Fourth, unlike Hau (2002), 
  4we directly test the hypothesis that trade openness helps attenuate the RER volatility after 
controlling for fundamental volatility. Fifth, we evaluate whether the composition of trade 
and capital flows may play a role in explaining the openness-RER volatility relationship. 
Finally, as opposed to periods of tranquility, we test whether the relationship between 
openness and RER volatility changes in times of currency crisis (i.e. turbulent times). 
Interestingly, we consistently find that higher trade openness leads to more stable 
RERs while higher international financial integration generates more volatile RERs. We 
also find that the composition of flows of trade and capital matters for explaining the 
openness-RER volatility link. Why? Due to the different nature of the shocks that govern: 
(a) manufacturing vs. non-manufacturing trade, and (b) equity- vs. loan-related financial 
openness. Specifically, we find that the ability of trade openness to smooth shocks to the 
RERs is mainly driven by manufacturing trade while non-manufacturing trade plays a 
limited and, in most cases, negligible role. The results on the composition of capital flows 
are striking: we not only find that financial openness may reduce RER volatility in countries 
with low debt-to-equity ratios, but also that higher share of debt in foreign liabilities may 
amplify RER volatility and increase the likelihood of currency crisis episodes.  
This paper consists of the following sections: Section 2 shows the main stylized facts of 
the model that draws the testable implications on the relationship between RER volatility 
and openness. Section 3 discusses the data and methodology of estimation. Section 4 
presents the regression analysis of the RER volatility in the baseline scenario and the 
sensitivity analysis to different samples and different measures of the dependent variable. 
Section 5 explores in more detail the nature of the openness-RER volatility link by 
analyzing the role of the composition of trade and capital flows as well as vulnerabilities in 
the external sector while section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Some Theoretical Insights 
In this section we present some theoretical foundations on the relationship among the 
volatility of RER fluctuations, the volatility of RER fundamentals (which we will also call 
fundamental volatility), and (trade and financial) openness. Rather than calibrating the model, 
we will conduct econometric tests for a wide sample of countries on the relationship 
between: (a) RER volatility and trade openness, and (b) RER volatility and financial 
openness. Our theoretical framework is redux model augmented by the presence of the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
2 Hau (2002) gathered data for 48 countries (of which 23 were OECD countries) over the 1980.01-1998.12 
period. 
  5government sector as outlined by Calderon (2004), and this model would render some 
testable implications for the relationship between RER volatility and trade openness. On 
the other hand, the testable implications of the relationship between RER volatility and 
financial openness are obtained from the simulation of a modified version of the redux 
model that incorporates cross-border financial restrictions (Sutherland, 1996). Sutherland’s 
model finds that the relationship between RER volatility and financial openness in the 
event of different types of shocks, Finally, the details of the definition of the variables, the 
main assumptions of the model, its basic set up and the steady state analysis are outlined in 
Appendix I.  
 
2.1 Introducing Some Notation 
Given the two-sector model (i.e. traded and non-traded sectors), the degree of trade 
openness is defined as 
N N T T
T T
C P C P
C P

  , where PT and PN represent the price level of 
trade and non-traded sectors, while CT and CN represent the consumption of traded and 
non-traded goods (see definition in Appendix I, section I.1). Once the steady state is 
computed (Appendix I, section I.2), we analyze the dynamics of the model by taking a log-
linear approximation around the benchmark steady state. Here, we define the short-run 
deviation of a certain variable X from the steady state as  X  = 0 0 1 / ) ( X X X  , while its long-
run deviation from the steady state is defined as  ˆ X = 0 0 / ) ( X X X  . Note that we assume 
that the economy is initially in steady state (at period 0). 
 
2.2 Testable Implications 
In this sub-section we present the relationship between: (a) volatility of RER 
fluctuations, fundamental volatility and trade openness, and (b) RER volatility, fundamental 
volatility and financial openness. The basic structural relationship between these variables is 
derived from the stylized Obstfeld-Rogoff redux model (1995) as well as the redux model 
that incorporates restrictions on cross-border transactions (Sutherland, 1996).  
 
2.2.1 Trade Openness and RER Volatility 
From the redux model outlined in Appendix I we will uncover the relationship between 
trade openness and real exchange rates in the face of shocks to productivity, money supply 
and government spending.  
  6Productivity Shocks: Assume unanticipated permanent technology shocks in the non-
traded sector of each country —i.e.   =  (and also assume that this surge is similar 
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     . Since we assume that there are constant 
endowments of traded goods,  T y , a constant net foreign asset position, and the 
consumption-smoothing motive, we have that  T C
~
= 0. If we log-linearize (I.9),  T N P C
~ ~
 , 
given that  N P
~
= 0 (since the model assumes price stickiness in the short-run). Then market-
clearing conditions for non-tradables,C N y N
~ ~
  determines that fluctuations in the prices of 
traded goods  N T A P ˆ
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1 ~
  . Since the law of one price for tradables holds, fluctuations in 
real exchange rate are 
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The volatility of RER fluctuations is found using (1), 
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where the greater the degree of openness (rising ), the smaller is the impact of volatile 
productivity shocks on the volatility of RER fluctuations. Note that expressing (2) in logs 
yields: 
) ˆ var( ln ) ( ln ) ~ var( ln N A A h q         ( 2 a )  
and we require to find a negative relationship between RER volatility and openness after 
controlling for shocks to productivity. 
Monetary Shocks: Suppose that the economy only faces unanticipated permanent 
monetary shocks —that is, M ˆ  = M
~
. Log-linearizing the money demand —eq. (I.11) —
around the steady state: 
    T T T p p p p p m ˆ ~
1
~ ~ ~ ~ 





and, since non-traded prices are fixed in the short-run,  N P
~
= 0, and money non-neutrality 
holds,   =  T P ~ M ˆ  = M
~
, we have   M P T ˆ
) 1 )( 1 (
) 1 ( ~
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3 Since the law of one 
 
M P T ˆ ~
 .  3 Note that if =1, 
  7price holds for traded goods, these prices change in proportion to exchange rate 
fluctuations, i.e.  . Hence, changes in the RER are defined as,   E P T
~ ~

T T P P E P E q ~ ) 1 ( ~ ~ ~ ~ ~            (3) 
and the volatility of RER changes becomes: 
) ˆ var( ) ( ) ~ var( M h q M         ( 4 )  
where hM () is the function that relates the volatility of RER fluctuations and the degree of 
openness. We can show that this relationship is negative. Again, we can express (4) in logs 
as 
) ˆ var( ln ) ( ln ) ~ var( ln M h q M         ( 4 a )  
Fiscal Shocks: Now we assume that the economy only faces unanticipated permanent 
fiscal shocks —that is,   = G G ˆ ~ . If we log-linearize equation (I.18) and combine with the 
other dynamic equations in the model, we have  G P T ˆ
) 1 ( ) 1 (
1 ~
     
  and changes in 
the RER are defined as:  
G q ˆ






      (5) 
with the volatility of RERs being: 
) ˆ var( ) ( ) ~ var( G h q G         ( 6 )  
where hG () is the function that relates the volatility of RER fluctuations and the degree of 
openness. It is also straightforward to show that this relationship is negative. Finally, the 
relationship between RER volatility (in logs) and openness is:  
) ˆ var( ln ) ( ln ) ~ var( ln G h q G         ( 6 a )  
Intuitively, trade openness can mitigate the volatility of RERs in the event of a shock 
through higher import penetration by allowing a faster channel for adjustment of the 
domestic aggregate price (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995; Hau, 2000). This reduces the short-
run impact of any shock (real or nominal) on real household balances and; hence, reduces 
the scope of such shock to generate real effects on the real effective exchange rate.   
 
2.2.2 Financial Openness and RER Volatility 
Rising financial integration was perceived as a factor associated with higher exchange 
rate instability. Dornbusch (1976) argued that freely operating foreign exchange rate 
markets would lead to an overshooting in nominal and real exchange rates in the short-run 
  8in the face of nominal shocks. In turn, this excessive exchange rate volatility would 
destabilize the real economy.  
Financial integration, on the other hand, is argued to allow agents within a country to 
share risks and individuals across countries to share country-specific risks. Thus, financial 
integration may allow agents to deal more effectively with random shocks. However, recent 
evidence shows that, during the current era of financial globalization, emerging markets 
have been unable to enjoy the benefits of financial integration —its degree of risk sharing 
has slightly declined (Kose, Prasad and Terrones, 2006). 
Sutherland (1996) incorporates the notion of financial market integration in the redux 
model as a result of reducing frictions that prevent the free flow of capital across 
international borders. He introduces two modifications to the redux model: (a) there is 
imperfect capital mobility across international borders, and (b) varying degrees of nominal 
inertia are considered by introducing multi-period nominal contracts. 
On the demand side of the model, consumption is determined intertemporally by 
agents and the presence of frictions in international financial transactions may reduce the 
ability to substitute intertemporally. On the supply side, goods markets do not clear period 
by period and shocks to the economy create short-run disequilibria that generate incentives 
for intertemporal substitutions of consumption and labor supply. Financial frictions would 
prevent intertemporal substitution from taking place. The model —as posed by Sutherland 
(1996) does not offer a closed-form solution and it is calibrated and simulated numerically.  
In the event of (asymmetric) money supply shocks, domestic and foreign bonds would pay 
different returns with imperfect capital mobility. If agents accumulate assets, domestic 
interest would be driven down. The fall in domestic real interest rates encourages domestic 
consumer to raise present consumption. With imperfect capital mobility, consumption 
differential is more positive and interest rate differentials become negative. Hence, 
exchange rate should not depreciate as much as in the perfect capital mobility scenario. In 
short, rising financial integration would reduce the volatility of interest rates while both the 
volatility of nominal and real exchange rates rises. In turn, output is more volatile in 
integrated markets and, as expected, consumption is less volatile. 
On the other hand, goods demand shocks (as captured in the model by increases in 
government spending) would cause domestic consumers to accumulate debt. With 
imperfect capital markets, debt accumulation drives interest rates up in domestic financial 
markets and, with higher real interest rates in the short run, individuals would be 
encouraged to shift towards future consumption. Domestic interest rates have increased 
  9while present consumption has declined by more than in the perfect mobility case. Hence, 
the exchange rate must depreciated by more in the short run, and this greater depreciation 
would cause output to expand even more in the short run. In sum, financial integration 
would exacerbate debt levels and mitigate the volatility of nominal and real exchange rates 
in response to a goods demand shock.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
In the present section we describe the data used for our empirical evaluation of RER 
volatility, fundamental volatility and openness, and we explain a detailed outline of the 
econometric technique used. 
 
3.1 The Data 
We have collected annual data on real effective exchange rates and its fundamentals 
(labor productivity, fiscal policy and monetary policy) for a sample of 82 countries over the 
period 1975-2005 (see list of countries in Table A.1). We have ignored the Bretton Woods 
period for two reasons (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2001): (a) to focus on the recent 
period of increasing integration to the world markets of goods and assets, and (b) the 
predominance of fixed exchange rate regimes implemented for political reasons. 
Our dependent variable, the volatility of RER fluctuations, is the standard deviation of 12-
month variation in the real effective exchange rate over a 5-year window computed using a 
monthly RER database. We chose the real effective exchange rate (instead of the bilateral 
real exchange rate of country i vis-à-vis the United States) due to its relevance for countries 
with more important macroeconomic and trade linkages with other countries rather than 
the United States and due to its equivalence to the exchange rate in models —as the one 
stated in section 2 —that summarizes foreign countries as a single foreign trading partner.  


































where sit is the nominal exchange rate for country i observed in period t expressed in units 
of local currency vis-à-vis the US dollar, Pit is the consumer price level of country i in 
period t, skt is the nominal exchange rate of the k-th trading partner in period t (with k  i), 




levels at time 0 represent the base period of our index numbers. Note that according to this 
definition, an increase in q implies a real appreciation of the local currency.  Hence, the 
RER volatility is the standard deviation of the (natural logarithm of the) RER variation 
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where qit is the log(Qit). Note that for robustness purposes we also compute the RER 
volatility of the 2-year (24-month) variation of the RER as well as 3-, 4- and 5-year 
variation. 
Openness: We now consider policy and outcome measures of trade and financial 
openness. Regarding trade openness, our policy measure is based on an updated version of the 
Sachs and Warner (1995) binary variable of trade liberalization (Wacziarg and Welch, 2003). 
This dummy variable takes the value of 1 whenever the trade regime is considered as an 
open one and 0 otherwise.
5 We use the share of years in the 5-year period that the country 
enjoys an open trade regime.  
The outcome measure of openness to international trade in goods and services is the real 
value of exports and imports (that is, total trade) as a percentage of GDP. Further tests on 
the smoothing properties of trade openness will imply the analysis of the composition of 
trade flows. In our paper we break down total trade as percentage of GDP into 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing trade (both expressed as percentage of GDP). The 
data for total trade and its composition is obtained from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI) and the United Nations’ COMTRADE database. 
Policy indicators of financial openness are measured by two different proxies: the first one 
is the IMF binary variable of capital account restrictions, which takes the value of 1 in the 
years when there are no restrictions on capital account transactions and 0 otherwise. We 
use the share of years in the 5-year period where there are no restrictions. The source of 
the data is Prasad, Rogoff, Wei and Kose (2003) based on the IMF Annual Report on 
                                                           
4 Data on exchange rates are drawn from the line rf of the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, which 
represents the average nominal exchange rate for the period. To approximate prices, we use the consumer 
price index (CPI) because of the timeliness of publication and the availability of the data on a monthly and 
quarterly basis.  
5 According to Sachs and Warner (1995, p. 22), we consider a country to have a closed trade policy if one of 
the following features hold: (i) More than 40% of its trade is covered by non-tariff barriers, (ii) It has average 
tariff barriers higher than or equal to 40%, (iii) Its black market exchange rate depreciates at a rate that is 
more than 20% relative to the official exchange rate (during the 1970s and 1980s), (iv) It has a socialist 
economic system, and (v) a state monopoly on major exports.  
  11Exchange Rate Arrangements and Restrictions.
6 However, countries with closed capital account 
may try to increase the stringency of those controls by imposing restrictions on current 
account transactions, multiple exchange rate practices or the surrender of export proceeds 
while countries with an open capital may still restrict the flow of capital by imposing other 
restrictions on cross-border financial transactions (Chinn and Ito, 2007). Therefore, our 
second policy measure is the Chinn-Ito index of financial openness which incorporates the 
different types of restrictions on cross-border financial transactions stated above. Further 
details on the construction of this index are given in Chinn and Ito (2007). 
Our outcome measure of financial openness involves data on foreign assets and liabilities 
from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2006). We construct the ratio of foreign liabilities as a 
percentage of GDP (which include stocks of liabilities in portfolio equity, foreign direct 
investment, debt and financial derivatives) and for robustness purpose the ratio of foreign 
assets and liabilities to GDP. Note that, for analogously to the case of trade openness, we 
would evaluate the role that the composition of capital flows may play in smoothing shocks 
to the RER. Hence, we break down our outcome measure of financial openness into 
equity- and loan-related foreign liabilities. While the former includes the foreign liability 
position in foreign direct investment and portfolio equity, the latter includes only the debt 
liability position. The same calculation is performed for the ratio of foreign assets and 
liabilities to GDP.  
Volatility of Fundamentals: We describe the sources of the data on the RER fundamentals 
formulated in the model and used in this paper. First, the volatility of productivity shocks is 
computed as the standard deviation of annual changes in the ratio of Home to Foreign 
labor productivity. Labor productivity is the ratio of real GDP to total employment and the 
magnitude for the foreign country is computed as the trade-weighted average of labor 
productivity of the rest of the world. In turn, real output is the real GDP as constructed by 
Loayza, Fajnzylber and Calderón (2005) using Summers and Heston (1991) output figures 
as well as WDI.  
Next, the volatility of fiscal policy,  Vol(Gi), is constructed following the methodology 
outlined in Fatas and Mihov (2006). We collect data on general government consumption 
and we isolate movements in government consumption that can be attributed to 
exogenous policy decisions and not related to the state of the economy. To isolate these 
exogenous policy changes, we regress for each country the (log of) real government 
                                                           
6 Data on capital account restrictions can be downloaded from: http://www.nber.org/~wei/data.html 
  12consumption spending (G) on real output (Y), the initial level of real government spending, 
linear and squared inflation ( and 
2) and a deterministic time trend (t), 
t i t i t i t i i t i i i t i G Y t G ,
2
, 2 , 1 1 , 1 , , 0 , , ln ln ) ln(                   
To prevent reverse causality from government spending to growth we instrument 
output growth with lagged values of output growth and current and lagged values of oil 
prices. We consider the standard deviation of the residual of this regression, Vol(i,t) as the 
estimate of the volatility of discretionary fiscal policy. Note that data on government 
expenditure was obtained from WDI while inflation and the world price of oil were taken 
from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS). 
7 
We also construct a measure of monetary policy volatility in the same fashion as the 
measure of fiscal policy volatility described above in spite of the difficulties to implement 
this measure across countries —as outlined by Fatas and Mihov (2006). We use data on the 
monetary base from IFS and from national sources whenever the data was unavailable 
from the IMF.  
Exchange Rate Regimes: In order to determine the exchange rate regime adopted by a 
country we use the classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). Here, we consider three 
binary variables. The dummy for fixed regimes takes the value of 1 if the country has either a 
hard peg or de facto pegs —that is a fixed exchange rate regime (and 0 otherwise). On the 
other hand, the dummy for intermediate regimes takes the value of 1 if the country has a de 
facto crawling peg or band (i.e. intermediate regimes). Finally, the flexible exchange rate regime 
is the base category and it is excluded from our regression analysis. Note that the Reinhart-
Rogoff database contains data up to 2001. From 2002 we have used the IMF’s new 
exchange rate regime classification from the Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements 
and Exchange Restrictions that follows the natural classification stipulated by Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004). 
Inflation: The monthly data on CPI collected for the calculation of the real effective 
exchange rate is used to compute annual inflation measures. For the purpose of our 
regression analysis we compute the 5-year period average of the annual inflation in our 
monthly database. 
Vulnerabilities: We construct our indicator of output concentration using the 9-sector 
classification from the 1-digit level ISIC code on economic activity, which comprises the 
following activities: (i) Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry, and Fishing; (ii) Mining and 
Quarrying; (iii) Manufacturing; (iv) Electricity, Gas, and Water; (v) Construction; (vi) 
  13Wholesale and Retail Trade; (vii) Transport, Storage and Communication; (viii) Finance, 
Insurance, Real Estate, and Business Services, (ix) Community, Social, and Personal 
Services. The data was obtained from the United Nations’ National Accounts database. We 
also construct the ratio of debt liabilities in total foreign liabilities as our proxy of the debt-
equity ratio —our measure of vulnerabilities in financial openness. The data to construct 
this ratio was obtained from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). 
Finally, Table A.2 presents a more detailed description of the sources of the data for all 




The proposed panel data regression poses some challenges for estimation. The first is 
the presence of unobserved period- and country-specific effects. The inclusion of period-
specific dummy variables can account for the time effects while country dummies deal with 
country-specific effects. The second challenge is that our variables of interest —trade and 
financial openness —are likely to be jointly endogenous with shocks to the RER; hence we 
need to control for the biases resulting from simultaneous or reverse causation in our RER 
volatility equation. 
Our baseline regression equation of RER volatility follows the following specification: 
it it it t i it dq          Θ Z Γ O ) ( ln      (7) 
where the dependent variable is the standard deviation of annual changes in the RER (in 
logs) using monthly data for the 1975-2005 period. The matrix Oit contains information on 
our variables of interest: trade and financial openness. We use either the policy or outcome 
measures of trade and financial openness. However, our benchmark result would be the 
one that uses exports and imports as percentage of GDP (in logs) as our indicator of trade 
openness, and foreign liabilities as percentage of GDP (in logs) as our measure of financial 
openness. Finally, the matrix Zit comprises the control variables for the RER volatility 
regression equation: the standard deviation of Home-Foreign labor productivity growth, 
monetary and fiscal policy volatility, dummy variables for fixed and intermediate exchange 
rate regimes, dummy for currency crisis, and the level of income per capita (at the start of 
the 5-year period). 
However, as we said above, it is highly likely that shocks to the RER (or RER volatility) 
may have an effect on trade and financial openness. Hence, we need to find appropriate 
                                                                                                                                                                          
7 Note that all standard deviation measures were taken for annual changes during 5-year periods.  
8 The present sub-section draws heavily from Loayza, Fajnzylber and Calderón (2005). 
  14instruments for our variables of interest. We first discuss the identification strategy for trade 
openness. Again, existing evidence shows that RER volatility may affect trade volumes 
(Broda and Romalis, 2003). As a result, it becomes necessary to control for reverse 
causation in trade openness. We follow the methodology of Frankel and Romer (1999) and 
we compute the geographic component of trade openness based on the gravity equation model of 
bilateral trade. This component is not only highly correlated with trade openness (given the 
empirical success of the gravity equation model) but also it is suspected to be uncorrelated 
with the volatility of RERs. The gravity equation model in its most parsimonious 
representation relates bilateral trade (expressed as a ratio to GDP) to geographic and size 
measures. In short, the amount of trade between two countries is inversely related to their 
distance and directly related to their size. The predicted trade to GDP ratio is a good 
instrument if it is highly correlated with trade since it is unlikely that geography would be 
related to economic outcomes through any channel other than trade (Cavallo and Frankel, 
2007).
9 A detailed description on the construction of the instrument for trade openness is 
provided in Appendix II. 
On the other hand, to instrument for financial openness we follow Faria, Lane, Mauro 
and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). The authors evaluate some dimensions of the external capital 
structure: total foreign liabilities (as % of GDP), and the share of equity (portfolio and 
FDI) in total foreign liabilities. Based on recent work by Faria and Mauro (2004), the 
authors choose a broad range of potential determinants of the external capital structure. 
Following their strategy we use an indicator of institutional quality (the ICRG index of 
political risk at the start of the five year period), the initial size of the country (as proxied by 
starting levels of GDP, population and area at the start of the five year period), the legal 
origin of countries (La Porta et al. 1998), secondary enrollment, and the abundance of 
natural resources. As we mentioned before, the timeline of these explanatory variables is 
the beginning of the 5-year period. As are consistent with the results in Faria and Mauro 
(2004) as well as in Faria et al. (2007), we find the following: first, countries with higher 
ratios of total foreign liabilities to GDP are smaller countries with better institutional 
quality, greater reliance on natural resources and with French civil code tradition. Second, a 
greater share of debt in external liabilities is achieved by smaller countries with lower levels 
of education attainment, poorer levels of institutional quality, and lower reliance on natural 
                                                           
9 Cavallo and Frankel (2007) point out that this methodology still poses some limitation. For instance, it does 
not allow for variation in the instrument over time so as to estimate a model with country-fixed effects. 
However, the authors do not consider this a serious limitation since most of the variation in trade openness is 
cross-country and not over time. 
 
  15resources. These results are consistent with Faria et al. (2007) where greater equity share in 
total liabilities is attained by larger countries with better institutional quality and greater 
reliance on natural resources.  
 
4.  Empirical Evidence 
This section describes the main results of our empirical analysis of the determinants of 
RER volatility for our sample of 82 countries, using 5-year non-overlapping observations, 
over the period 1975-2005. First, we describe the main statistics and present a basic 
correlation analysis. Then, we carry out the panel data regression analysis. 
 
4.1 Basic Statistics and Correlation Analysis 
Table 1 presents the basic statistics on RER volatility, openness and the volatility of the 
RER fundamentals. We report the averages of these variables for the full sample of 
countries and for sub-samples classified according to the level of development of the 
economy and the income level. 
We first find that RER fluctuations are more volatile in developing countries than in 
industrial economies. On average, RER volatility in developing countries is almost twice as 
volatile as that of industrial economies. This reflects the higher volatility in the RER 
fundamentals in developing countries: productivity shocks and monetary policy shocks in 
developing countries are, on average, more than twice as volatile as those in advanced 
economies while fiscal policy shocks are almost five times as volatile in developing 
countries as those shocks in industrial countries. 
Second, although industrial countries have a larger history of free trade regimes 
according to the Wacziarg-Welch policy indicator of trade openness, data on real exports 
and imports as percentage of GDP shows that, on average, developing countries are more 
integrated to the world markets of goods than industrial economies —particularly, in trade 
of non-manufacturing goods (that is, trade in commodities). On the other hand, industrial 
economies are more integrated to international financial markets than developing countries 
—either using policy or outcome measures of financial openness. 
Third, low-income countries display higher RER volatility as well as higher 
fundamental volatility (i.e. productivity shocks, monetary and fiscal policy). They are not 
only less integrated to the world markets of goods but also have more restrictions on cross-
border transactions and lower degree of international financial integration. Moreover low-
  16income countries exhibit lower levels of output diversification and a higher debt-equity 
ratio than countries in other income groups. 
In Table 2 we report the panel correlation analysis for the RER volatility, openness and 
the volatility of RER fundamentals. We report the correlation for the full sample of 
countries as well as sub-samples according to level of development. 
Correlation between RER Volatility and Openness: We find that RER volatility and trade 
openness (either proxied by the outcome or policy measure) are negatively correlated for 
the sample of all countries as well as for the samples of industrial and developing countries  
and it is significant in most cases. This implies that the higher the degree of openness to 
international trade in goods and services (and the longer the existence of an open trade 
regime in a country), the lower the volatility of the RER fluctuations. We should point out 
that the negative correlation between trade openness (as proxied by real exports and 
imports to GDP) and RER volatility is mainly explained by trade in manufacturing. 
Figure 1 presents the simple scatter plot of RER volatility (as proxied by the standard 
deviation of 12-month RER variations) and the outcome measure of trade openness. 
Although countries more integrated to world goods markets tend to display lower RER 
volatility, the nature of the trade openness may affect its ability to smooth RER 
fluctuations. We specifically find that countries with less diversified structures of 
production tend to display more volatile RERs. This is consistent with the finding that 
countries with less diversified structures of production tend to display higher terms of trade 
volatility (Baxter and Kouparitsas, 2007; Loayza and Raddatz, 2006). Furthermore the 
correlation between trade openness and RER volatility changes when distinguishing 
between trade in manufacturing and non-manufacturing goods (expressed as % of GDP). 
In short, countries tend to display lower RER volatility when trade openness in 
manufacturing goods is larger while there is a positive although weak relationship between 
RER volatility and trade openness in non-manufacturing goods. 
On the other hand, RER volatility does not show a robust correlation with financial 
openness: the sign of the correlation coefficient depends upon the measure of financial 
openness used and on the sample of countries evaluated. We find that RER volatility is 
inversely related to either policy measure of financial openness (either the IMF’s index of 
capital account openness or Chinn-Ito’s measure of financial openness), whereas the 
correlation of RER volatility and outcome measures of financial openness (foreign liabilities 
and foreign assets and liabilities) are negative and weak for the full sample of countries. For 
industrial economies as well as for high-income countries greater financial openness seems 
  17to be associated with more stable RERs. However, this relationship is not robust for 
developing countries. We should also note that the composition of capital flows may 
matter for stabilizing the RER: more volatile RERs are associated to countries with higher 
loan-related financial openness and lower equity-related financial openness (see Figure 2). 
Consistent to the finding mentioned above, we find that RERs are more unstable in 
countries with higher debt-to-equity ratio.  
Correlation between RER and Fundamental Volatility: We first find that RER volatility is 
positively correlated with the volatility of the RER fundamentals (say, productivity shocks, 
fiscal policy and monetary policy) for the full sample of countries as well as for the sub-
samples of industrial and developing countries. The correlation between RER volatility and 
the volatility of productivity shocks is greater among industrial countries than among 
developing countries (0.49 vs. 0.29) and it is significant for both groups of countries. 
Monetary policy volatility is also positively related to RER volatility although the 
correlation coefficient is significant for the full sample of countries and for the sample of 
developing economies. The same result holds for the correlation between RER volatility 
and fiscal policy volatility. 
 
4.2 Panel Regression Analysis: Baseline Regression Analysis 
Using a sample of 82 countries over the period 1975-2005, we conduct our 
econometric analysis to test the basic implications of the model outline in Section 2 by 
formulating a baseline regression equation for the RER volatility. As we stated in the 
previous sections, our dependent variable is the standard deviation of changes in the real 
effective exchange rate (in logs) and our baseline specification is represented by equation 
(7) –see section 3.2. Recall that the matrix Oit comprises (outcome and policy) measures of 
trade and financial openness, and Zit represents the matrix of control variables. In our 
analysis, Z is conformed by the (log) level of output per capita (in logs), dummy variables 
for fixed and intermediate exchange rate regimes and the vector of fundamental volatility 
—that is, volatility of Home-Foreign productivity differentials as well as monetary and 
fiscal policy volatility. 
In Table 3 we present the estimation results of the baseline regression model using least 
squares estimators and controlling for country- and period-specific effects. We regress the 
RER volatility on our indicators of openness (integration to international goods and capital 
markets), dummies for fixed and intermediate exchange rate regimes, the level of output 
per capita and the volatility of fundamentals (such as productivity shocks, discretionary 
  18fiscal and monetary policy shifts). In general, we find that RER volatility is higher in 
countries with more flexible exchange rate regimes, higher inflation, during periods of 
currency crises, and in low-income countries —although the coefficient of the latter is not 
significant for all specifications in Table 3. On the other hand, RERs are more unstable in 
countries that suffer from more volatile shocks to productivity and sharper shifts in 
discretionary monetary and fiscal policies. In most cases, the estimated coefficients of these 
determinants are statistically significant.  
Our main goal is to test the relationship between RER volatility and openness. Using 
policy measures of openness, we find that there is no robust relationship between the 
Wacziarg and Welch (2003) trade liberalization measure and RER volatility while there is a 
negative and significant association between RER volatility and the Chinn-Ito (2007) index 
of financial openness.
10 In short, RER volatility will be higher in countries with more 
restrictions in cross-border transactions. On the other hand, using outcome measures of 
openness, we find that RERs are more volatile in countries less integrated with world 
goods markets and in countries more integrated to international capital markets. The latter 
result is inconsistent with the one obtained with the policy measure and we argue that the 
smoothing properties of financial openness may rely on the composition of capital flows. 
Table 4 shows our baseline regression for the RER volatility equation using 
instrumental variables. As explained in section 3, we use the gravity equation model to 
instrument for trade openness in the same fashion as Frankel and Romer (1999), and we 
follow Faria et al. (2007) to select instruments for financial openness. What are the main 
lessons of the IV estimates of our baseline regressions? We first find that the higher the 
volatility of (Home to Foreign relative) productivity shocks, the higher the volatility of real 
exchange rate fluctuations is. Higher RER volatility could also be the result of erratic fiscal 
and monetary policies undertaken by the government and the Central Bank, respectively.  
According to our estimates in column [5] of Table 4 we find that if the volatility of 
productivity shocks is halved, then RER volatility would decrease by 19 percent. An 
analogous decline in both monetary and fiscal policy volatility would imply reductions in 
RER volatility of approximately 6 and 8 percent, respectively. On the other hand, if the 
volatility of the different RER fundamentals of the average developing country were to be 
reduce to the levels of the average industrial economy (see averages in Table 1), then RER 
volatility would have declined by 22 percent in the case of productivity shocks, 9% for 
                                                           
10 Note that the policy measures of trade openness are a better indicator of whether the country is integrated 
or not to world markets of goods and do not provide any quantitative measure of their degree of integration. 
  19reductions in the volatility of fiscal policy, and 14 percent due to more stable discretionary 
monetary policies. 
Next, trade openness measured by outcome indicators has a negative relationship with 
RER volatility. Hence, the more open is the economy to international trade in goods and 
services, the less volatile its real exchange rate is. Note that, on average, real exports and 
imports represent slightly more than 50 percent of GDP among developing countries. An 
increase in trade openness to 75 percent of GDP for developing countries would lead to a 
reduction in the volatility of real exchange rate fluctuations between 7 and 12 percent.  
Third, financial openness measured by outcome indicators has a positive relationship 
with RER volatility. As a result, the RER volatility is higher in countries that are more 
integrated to international capital markets. According to our estimates if foreign liabilities 
were to increase from approximately the average of developing countries to the average of 
industrial economies (that is, from 71 to 82 percent of GDP), then RER volatility would 
jump between 9 and 12 percent. On the other hand, an analogous increase in foreign assets 
and liabilities (from 98 to 146% of GDP) would increase RER volatility by 33-41 percent.   
Finally, we find that RER is lower in less flexible exchange rate regimes and higher 
during times of currency crisis. Compared to floating regimes, RER volatility in fixed 
exchange rate regimes is lower by a third (33 percent) while RER volatility is almost 30 
percent higher during times of crisis. Inflation exerts a destabilizing effect on the volatility 
of RERs. Thus, reducing inflation from the average of developing countries to that of 
industrial countries would reduce RER volatility by 8-12 percent. Moreover, the level of 
development plays a part in the story: richer countries display more stable exchange rate 
fluctuations. 
In sum, our results are consistent with the predictions of the redux model and its 
extensions (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995; Sutherland, 1996; Hau, 2002). Trade openness 
helps attenuate the effects of volatile fluctuations in RER fundamentals while financial 
openness amplifies shocks to the RER. The latter is consistent with the prevalence of 
nominal shocks. Our further interest is to investigate in this paper the robustness of these 






  204.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
In this section we conduct a sensitivity analysis of our results in section 4.2 by testing 
the robustness of our results to: (a) changes in the sample of countries, and (b) changes in 
the dependent variable. 
 
4.3.1 Sensitivity to Changes in the Sample of Countries 
Table 5 shows the instrumental variable (IV) estimates of our baseline RER volatility 
regression equation for the full sample of countries as well as for groups of countries 
classified by their level of development (industrial vs. developing countries) and by their 
level of income (high-, middle-, and low-income countries). We also include a regression 
for the sample of emerging market economies. 
As observed in section 4.2 (see column [1] of Table 5), trade openness has a negative 
and significant relationship with RER volatility while financial openness (as proxied by 
foreign liabilities to GDP) has a positive and significant one. In short, while trade openness 
dampens shocks to the RER, financial openness amplifies them. Are these results robust 
across sub-samples of countries or are they driven by a specific group of countries? 
We find that our findings for the full sample of countries also hold for the sample of 
developing countries, the samples of middle- and low-income countries as well as for 
emerging market economies. It is quite interesting that trade openness and financial 
openness have a negative estimated coefficient although not statistically significant for the 
samples of industrial economies and high-income countries.  
Industrial Economies: We find that shifts in fiscal policy may affect the stability of the 
RERs and that more flexible exchange rate arrangements tend yield more volatile RERs. 
Relative to industrial countries with flexible exchange rate regimes, RER volatility is 
approximately 45% and 49% lower in industrial economies with intermediate and fixed 
exchange rate regimes, respectively. 
Developing countries: Greater trade openness seems to help stabilizing RERs. Doubling 
the degree of trade openness in developing countries would help reduce RER volatility by 
approximately 9%. On the other hand, greater financial openness may destabilize RERs. 
Raising the level of foreign liabilities (as % of GDP) from the average developing country 
to the average industrial economy would increase the volatility of RERs by 10%. Also, 
inflation would significantly contribute to increasing the volatility of RERs. Finally, RER 
volatility would increase by approximately 30% during times of currency crisis and 
developing countries with higher income levels seem to enjoy more stable RERs.  
  21Countries classified by income levels: We should point out that the results found for high-
income countries are qualitatively similar to those found for industrial economies. Trade 
and financial openness did not seem to play a significant role in smoothing RER shocks, 
and RER volatility is larger not only for countries with more flexible exchange rate 
arrangements but also during episodes of currency crisis in high-income countries. For 
middle- and low-income countries, the results are also qualitatively similar to those of the 
sample of developing countries. Trade openness mitigates shocks to the RER while 
financial openness tends to amplify them. As we find before, doubling the degree of trade 
openness would lead to a reduction in RER volatility of 13% in both samples of middle- 
and low-income countries. However, if the ratio of foreign liabilities to GDP of both 
middle- and low-income countries were raised to the average level of high-income 
countries, the RER volatility would increase by approximately 19 and 14%, respectively. 
Higher inflation leads to higher RER volatility in middle- and low-income countries: a 
reduction of 5 percentage points on the annual average inflation rate would lead to a 
reduction of 2 and 4 percent in RER volatility, respectively. Note that volatile productivity 
shocks would also lead to a significantly higher RER volatility for middle- and low-income 
countries. Lastly, erratic shifts in fiscal policy seem to exert a destabilizing effect on RER 
volatility among middle-income countries. 
Emerging markets: RER volatility is lower in countries with higher trade openness and 
lower financial openness among countries in this group. RER volatility would decline by 
13% if trade openness doubles while it increases by more than 34% if their ratio of foreign 
liabilities to GDP increases to the level of high-income countries. On the other hand, RER 
volatility is smaller in emerging market economies with fixed exchange rate regimes (by 
approximately 40%) as well as with intermediate regimes (by 37%). Finally, volatile 
productivity shocks contribute to higher RER volatility. 
 
4.3.2 Sensitivity to Changes in the Dependent Variable  
So far the dependent variable in our regression analysis is the standard deviation of 12-
month RER variation. Our current task is that we test the robustness of our results by 
enlarging the horizon of the RER variation over which the volatility is computed. Indeed 
we calculate the standard deviation of RER changes over horizons of 24 months, as well as 
36, 48, and 60 months.  We should point that Hau (2002) used only the 36-month (3-year) 
variation in the monthly series of real effective exchange rates. Table 6 reports our results 
using IV regression techniques. 
  22In general, we find a robust negative relationship between RER volatility and trade 
openness as well as a robust positive relationship between RER volatility and financial 
openness. Other results: RER volatility is lower in countries with less flexible exchange rate 
regimes (especially, fixed rates), higher in episodes of high inflation and currency crisis, and 
higher whenever productivity shocks or fiscal policies are more volatile. 
We should remark that the IV coefficients of trade openness are negative and 
significant (except in 4- and 5-year RER changes) while the estimates of financial openness 
are positive and significant regardless of the horizon over which changes in the RER are 
computed. The coefficient of trade openness also declines (in absolute value) as the 
horizon over which the changes in the RER increases. When controlling for fundamental 
volatility —see columns [6] through [10] in Table 6— we observe that doubling trade 
openness would reduce RER volatility by 16% in the case of the volatility of 12-month 
variation in RER, 13% for the volatility of 36-month variation in RER, and only 4% for the 
volatility of 60-month variation in RER —although this latter impact is not statistically 
significant. On the other hand, the coefficient of financial openness rises as the horizon 
over which the changes in the RER reach 36 months. For instance, if the ratio of foreign 
liabilities jumps from the average developing country to the average industrial economy, 
RER volatility increases by 12% for the volatility of 12-month RER variation, and by 
13.5% for the volatility of the 36-month variation in RER. 
 
5.  Extensions 
In Section 4 we evaluated the relationship between RER volatility and (trade and 
financial) openness. Our empirical analysis rendered a robust negative correlation between 
(policy and outcome) measures of trade openness and real exchange rate volatility and a 
robust positive relationship between (outcome measures of) financial openness and RER 
volatility. Rising trade integration would reduce RER volatility while higher international 
financial integration would lead to more unstable real exchange rates.  
The fact that trade openness may help dampen shocks to the RER is supported not 
only by theoretical foundations (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995; Hau, 2000; Drozd and Nosal, 
2007) but also by cross-section empirical evidence (Hau, 2002). However, we further 
investigate the properties of trade openness to shield the RER from shocks by 
decomposing trade openness into trade in manufacturing goods and trade in non-
manufacturing goods. We expect that the latter is more volatile to terms of trade 
fluctuations; therefore, may destabilize the real exchange rate. 
  23As the theoretical model by Sutherland (1996) suggests that the relationship between 
financial openness and real exchange rate volatility depends on the nature of the shocks, we 
might expect a negative correlation in the presence of real shocks and a positive one in the 
presence of nominal shocks. Our results show that there is a negative relationship between 
our policy measure of financial openness (Chinn-Ito index of financial openness) and RER 
volatility but a positive one for outcome measures (foreign assets and liabilities). In order to 
disentangle the different results obtained with policy and outcome measures of financial 
openness on RER volatility, we argue that in order to capture more accurately the effects of 
financial openness on RER volatility we need to decompose financial openness into equity-
related vs. loan-related foreign assets and liabilities. In short, the composition of capital 
flow matters to understand the role of financial openness in smoothing shocks to the RER. 
Finally, the incidence of sudden stops among developing economies (and especially 
among emerging markets) may also explain the destabilizing nature of the relationship 
between financial openness and RER volatility. Therefore, we will test the relationship 
between RER volatility and openness in turbulent times —that is, we will evaluate the 
impact of financial openness on the likelihood of a drop in the RER or a currency crisis. 
 
5.1 RER Volatility and the Composition of Trade and Capital Flows 
Now we test whether the composition of capital and trade flows plays a role in the 
ability of trade and financial openness in smoothing shocks to the RER. Our analysis will 
be undertaken in two dimensions: first, we will interact trade openness with a measure of 
real vulnerability (say, a measure of output concentration) and financial openness with a 
measure of financial vulnerability (say, the debt-equity ratio), and test whether the 
smoothing abilities of trade and financial openness are affected by these characteristics. 
Second, we decompose trade openness into the ratio of trade manufacturing vs. trade in 
non-manufacturing goods (as a percentage of GDP) as well as financial openness into 
equity-related foreign (assets and) liabilities and loan-related foreign (assets and) liabilities 
(also as percentage of GDP) to test whether the composition of trade and capital flows 
matters for the smoothing properties of trade and financial openness.  
 
5.1.1  The Role of Real and Financial Vulnerabilities 
In this sub-section we include the interaction between (trade and financial) openness 
with (real and financial) vulnerabilities. We specifically include in our regression analysis not 
only measures of real and financial vulnerabilities —such as, the Herfindahl index of 
  24output concentration and the debt-to-equity ratio —but also the interaction between trade 
openness and output concentration as well as financial openness and the ratio of debt-to-
equity. In this framework, the impact of openness on RER volatility will depend on the 
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where TO and FO represent trade and financial openness, H(y) is the Herfindahl index of 
output concentration, and (D/E) is the debt-equity ratio (proxied by the ratio of debt 
liabilities to total foreign liabilities). We expect that the more vulnerable the economy is to 
either real or financial shocks —as captured by higher output concentration or higher debt-
to-equity ratio —the poorer is the ability of trade and financial openness to smooth shocks 
to the RER. That is, we expect 1, 1 < 0 and 2, 2 > 0. 
Table 7 reports the regression analysis including the vulnerabilities and their interaction 
with openness using the 5-year non-overlapping sample over the period 1975-2005 and for 
the sake of brevity we will discuss the IV estimates. Our estimates show that RER volatility 
would be lower in more open economies with less diversified economic structure. The 
interaction between trade openness and output concentration is positive and significant in 
most of the cases, thus rendering the expected result.  
The response of RER volatility to doubling the extent of trade openness conditional on 
the Herfindahl index of output concentration is presented in the panel I of Figure 3. We 
observe that trade openness can mitigate shocks to the RER in countries with well-
diversified structures of production. Our Herfindahl index takes values between 0.13 and 
0.50 and the turning point when trade openness amplifies RER volatility fluctuates between 
0.27 and 0.29. We should also emphasize that approximately 95 percent of our sample lies 
below the turning point specified above. This implies that for most country observations in 
our sample, the integration to international markets of goods may help reduce the volatility 
of RERs. Economically speaking, doubling the extent of trade openness would lead to a 
reduction in RER volatility of 33 percent for countries with very diversified production 
structure (10
th percentile in the distribution of the Herfindahl index of output = 0.145), 
while RER volatility declines only 14 percent for countries with very concentrated 
structures of production (90
th percentile in the distribution of the Herfindahl index of 
output = 0.236). 
On the other hand, we find that the coefficient of financial openness is negative and 
significant while the interaction between financial openness and the debt-to-equity ratio is 
  25positive and significant regardless of the specification and econometric technique used in 
Table 7. Our measure of debt-equity ratio —the percentage of foreign debt in total foreign 
liabilities (in logs) —ranges between 2.79 and 4.61 (that is, between 16 and 100 percent), 
and the turning point where financial openness amplifies shocks to RER is when foreign 
liabilities to GDP is higher than 80% of GDP. Panel I in Figure 4 shows that rising 
financial openness would lead to less volatile RERs in countries with lower debt-to-equity 
ratio, and it would destabilize RERs in countries with a higher share of debt rather than 
equity flows. Economically speaking, if we raise the level of financial openness of 
developing countries to the average among industrial economies then RER volatility would 
decline by 18% for countries with low debt-equity ratio (10
th percentile = 3.93 in logs or 
51%) and would increase by 5% in countries with high debt-equity ratio (90
th percentile = 
4.54 or 94%). Also note that depending on the specification the turning point of the debt-
equity ratio ranges between 71 to 81%.  
In sum, our analysis of the interaction of openness and vulnerability renders the 
following results: (i) Differences in the RER volatility response for non-diversified and 
well-diversified economies is significant for developing countries. (ii) Although RER 
volatility rises in response to higher output concentration in countries with low and high 
trade openness, the extent of openness does not explain differences in the response of 
RER volatility to higher output concentration. (iii) Financial openness dampens shocks to 
the RER for countries with low debt-equity ratios while it amplifies them for countries with 
high debt-equity ratios. The role played by the structure of external capital is crucial to 
explain cross-country differences in the sensitivity of RER volatility to financial openness. 
(iv) Rising debt-equity ratios (that is, a higher share of debt in total foreign liabilities) 
generate more volatile RERs in countries with medium to high levels of financial openness.  
(v) The two latter results are consistent with the view that a high share of equity in the 
structure of external liabilities is desirable for improving the country’s resilience to external 
shocks (Rogoff, 1999). 
 
5.1.2 Composition of Trade and Financial Flows 
We have already shown that the ability of trade and financial openness to smooth 
shocks to the RER depends on the degree of diversification of the real economy and the 
degree of vulnerability to capital flows (as measured by the debt-to-equity ratio). At present 
we conduct further tests on the smoothing properties of openness by decomposing trade 
openness into trade in manufacturing and trade in non-manufacturing goods, and financial 
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(assets and) liabilities. Following Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003), the measure of equity-














where PEQL and FDIL are the stocks of portfolio equity and FDI liabilities.
11 Note that 
we have also used the ratio of the stocks of portfolio equity and FDI assets and liabilities to 
GDP. This variable indicates the level of equity (portfolio and FDI cross-holdings). In 
addition, the measures of loan-related financial openness are computed as either the ratio of 
loan liabilities to GDP or the ratio of loan assets and liabilities to GDP.  
In Table 8 we present the regression results where we include trade in manufacturing 
and non-manufacturing goods as well as equity- and loan-related financial openness for our 
sample of 5-year of non-overlapping observations. Our following discussion of the results 
will focus on the IV regression estimates in columns [5] through [8] in Table 8. 
We find a robust negative relationship between trade in manufacturing and RER 
volatility regardless of the specification and econometric technique used. At the same time, 
the coefficient estimate of trade in non-manufacturing goods shows a negative coefficient 
although statistically not different from zero. This result may suggest the superior ability of 
manufacturing trade in smoothing shocks to the RER.  
On the other hand, equity-related financial openness —as measured by either foreign 
liabilities and foreign assets and liabilities in FDI and equity —has a negative and 
significant coefficient (in some cases) while loan-related financial openness —that is, either 
loan liabilities or loan assets and liabilities — has a robust positive relationship with RER 
volatility. Hence, RERs are more volatile the larger is the extent of loan-related financial 
openness and the smaller the degree of equity-related financial openness —although this 
latter relationship is not robust). 
We use the regression estimates of column [8] in Table 8 to provide some economic 
interpretation of our results. Assume an increase in manufacturing trade from the average 
of developing countries to the one among industrial economies (that is, an increase from 
13 to 34% of GDP), and an analogous increase for equity-related and loan-related financial 
openness. This implies an increase in equity-related foreign assets and liabilities from 12.1 
to 32.5% of GDP, and an increase in loan-related foreign assets and liabilities from 77.4 to 
105.5 percent of GDP. Our estimates suggest that RER volatility would decline by 32% in 
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18% if equity-related financial openness elevates, and it increases by 34% in the event of 
higher loan-related financial openness. Note that if both (the log of the ratio of) equity-
related and loan-related financial openness were to increase at the same rate (say each ratio 
increases by 20%), RER volatility would decline by 4% due to equity-related financial 
openness and would increase by 21% due to loan-related financial openness. In sum, RER 
volatility would increase if equity and loan positions experience a similar rate of growth.  
 
5.2 Openness and RER Volatility in “Turbulent” Times  
Fluctuations in RER can be determined by fluctuations of fundamentals at regular 
business cycle frequencies. However, drastic reversals in terms of trade, drops in output 
and productivity and sudden stops in capital inflows can produce sharp swings in the real 
exchange rate. In the present sub-section, we test whether the relationship between 
openness and RER volatility in “periods of tranquility” (associated with regular business cycle 
fluctuations) remains invariant in “turbulent times” (associated with episodes of currency 
crisis). 
We capture RER volatility in turbulent times by either of the two binary variables: (a) 
RER drops that takes the value of one whenever the real exchange rate depreciates more 
than 25 percent,
12 and (b) currency crisis that takes the value of one for episodes of currency 
crisis as defined by Frankel and Rose (1996).
13 Hence, we run probit regressions for RER 
drops and for currency crisis using annual data for the period 1975-2005. The determinants on 
the incidence of either RER drops or currency crisis follows Milesi-Ferretti and Razin 
(1998): lagged values of economic growth, the ratio of reserves to imports, the extent of 
RER overvaluation, fixed exchange rate regimes, and external shocks such as shifts in 
terms of trade, external demand and international real interest rates. Again, our variables of 
interest are trade and financial openness.  
Openness and RER Volatility in “Turbulent Times.” Our probit regression results are 
reported in Table 9. We find that the likelihood of RER drops or currency crisis is smaller 
in countries with increasing growth, higher ratio of reserves to imports, lower inflation, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
11 We also used the ratio of the stocks of portfolio equity and FDI assets and liabilities to GDP. Note that 
this variable indicates the level of equity (portfolio and FDI cross-holdings). 
12 We have also defined a real exchange rate drop for declines in the RER of 15, 20, 30 and 40 percent, and 
the results have remained invariant. Although the results are not reported, they are available from the authors 
upon request. 
13 Frankel and Rose (1996) define a currency crisis episode as the event where the local currency depreciates 
at least 25% and where the rate of depreciation has risen at least 10%. 
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demand.  
We interestingly find that if we focus on our IV estimates, there is no robust 
relationship between RER drops and (trade and financial) openness. Apparently, trade and 
financial openness does not seem to act as a buffer in the event of a drastic drop in the 
RER. However, we may further investigate whether the composition of trade and capital 
flows may play a role in explaining the non-significance of these coefficients.  
The incidence of currency crisis is smaller when the economy is more integrated to the 
world goods markets, and it is more likely to happen when the economy is integrated to 
international capital markets. Note that this result is qualitatively similar to the findings in 
Tables 3 and 4: higher RER volatility in countries with lower (higher) integration to 
international goods (capital) markets. This implies that (trade and financial openness) may 
qualitatively have the same smoothing properties in periods associated with regular 
business cycle frequencies and during currency crisis episodes. 
Openness, Composition and RER Volatility in “Turbulent times.” As earlier, we include 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing trade as well as equity-related and loan-related 
financial openness in our probit regressions for real exchange rate drops and currency 
crisis. Our estimates are reported in Table 10 and we will discuss our IV regression results, 
where we account for the likely reverse causality of trade and financial openness. 
As we see before, we find that RER overvaluation may precede the occurrence of 
either RER drops or currency crisis episodes, and that these turbulent events may be more 
likely to happen with low growth, high inflation and lower reserves to imports ratio. The 
likelihood of RER drops or currency crisis is less likely to happen in the event of favorable 
shocks to terms of trade and external demand. 
Regarding our variables of interest, RER drops are more likely to happen whenever 
there is higher increase in non-manufacturing trade and rising loan-related financial 
openness. These collapses in RER are less likely to happen if there is a surge in 
manufacturing trade and an increase in equity-related financial openness. As a result, the 
ability of trade and financial openness to shield the economy from drastic swings in the 
RER would depend on whether the share of manufacturing in total trade as well as the 
share of equity-related financial flows increases over time.  
On the other hand, higher manufacturing trade would reduce the likelihood of currency 
crisis while there is no robust relationship between non-manufacturing trade and the 
incidence of currency crisis. Hence, manufacturing trade may play a buffer role to shocks 
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of currency crisis while loan-related financial openness increases this likelihood. Note that 
the marginal effects of loan-related financial openness to currency crisis double that of 
equity-related financial openness. Therefore, for financial openness to reduce the likelihood 
of currency crisis, it is required a faster increase in equity-related flows (relative to debt 
flows). This result is consistent with the finding that equity —and, in particular, foreign 
direct investment —appears to be more stable in (and, hence, shield the economy against) 
sudden stops to financial flows (Levchenko and Mauro, 2006). 
 
6.  Conclusions 
Based on the exchange rate redux model and its variations (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995; 
Sutherland, 1996; Hau, 2002), we find that including measures of trade and financial 
openness will increase the explanatory power of the volatility of shocks to fundamentals in 
our RER volatility regressions. We gather information for 82 countries (of which 22 are 
industrial economies) over the period 1975-2005 on real effective exchange rates, labor 
productivity in Home and Foreign country, measures of discretionary fiscal and monetary 
policies a la Fatas and Mihov (2006), policy and outcome measures of trade and financial 
openness, inflation and de facto exchange rate regimes.  
In general, we find that highly volatile shifts in labor productivity as well as sharp 
fluctuations in monetary and fiscal policy would result in high RER volatility. Cutting 
fundamental volatility in half would reduce RER volatility by 19 percent in the case of 
productivity shocks and by 6 and 8 percent for monetary and fiscal policy volatility, 
respectively.
14  
Countries that are more integrated with world goods markets tend to exhibit more 
stable RERs. This result holds regardless of using outcome or policy measures of trade 
openness, and provides empirical validity to the implications the exchange rate redux model 
(Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995; Hau, 2002). Note that the fact that countries with higher trade 
linkages display more stable exchange rates is consistent with the evidence presented by 
Devereux and Lane (2003) and Broda and Romalis (2003). Economically speaking, 
doubling the degree of trade openness would result in a reduction of RER volatility 
between 7 and 12 percent. In contrast to the mitigating role of trade openness, outcome 
measures of financial openness seem to amplify the shocks to RERs. Since Sutherland (1996) 
predicts a positive RER volatility-financial openness correlation in the presence of nominal 
                                                           
14 These results are obtained using the coefficient estimates in column [5] of Table 4. 
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predominance of nominal shocks over real shocks. Note that these results are robust to 
changes in sample of countries, definition of the dependent variable and the organization 
of the dataset.  
Interestingly, our policy measure (Chinn-Ito index of financial openness) renders a 
different result: it dampens shocks to the RER. We argue that the composition of capital 
flows may play a role in the resilience of countries to external shocks. Specifically, we argue 
that countries with higher share of equity (debt) in total foreign liabilities would be more 
(less) resilient to shocks to the RER. This implies that the sign of the coefficient of total 
foreign liabilities becomes an empirical issue: it is positive (negative) if the amplifying 
(mitigating) role of debt- (equity-) related liabilities prevails. 
We conduct further explorations of the openness-RER volatility link. Specifically, we 
investigate whether the nature of the link between openness and RER volatility may be 
affected by the composition of trade and capital flows. This experiment is conducted at two 
different levels: (a) we test the role of output concentration and the debt-equity ratio in the 
smoothing properties of trade and financial openness, and (b) we evaluate the smoothing 
ability of manufacturing vs. non-manufacturing trade, and equity- vs. loan-related foreign 
(assets and) liabilities. 
Our analysis renders some interesting results: (i) trade openness helps attenuate shocks 
to the RER, and the ability of trade openness to smooth shocks to RERs is weaker in 
countries with higher levels of output concentration, (ii) financial openness mitigates 
(amplifies) RER volatility in countries with lower (higher) shares of debt in total foreign 
liabilities, (iii) RER are more stable in countries with well-diversified output structures and 
greater share of equity in total foreign liabilities, (iv) manufacturing trade helps attenuate 
shocks to the RER while non-manufacturing trade seems to play no role, and, finally, (v) 
equity-related financial openness helps reduce RER volatility whereas loan-related financial 
openness amplifies it. Note that these results are consistent with the fact that greater 
equity-related financial openness may enhance the resilience of the country against shocks 
—especially, shocks to the RER (Rogoff, 1999). 
Finally, we find that trade openness (mainly driven by manufacturing trade) helps to 
reduce the likelihood of severe drops in the real exchange rate or currency crisis —which is 
consistent with the findings of Cavallo and Frankel (2007). On the other hand, higher 
international financial integration seems to increase the likelihood of RER drops or 
currency crisis. Interestingly, the composition of capital flows plays a key role in 
  31disentangling the effects of financial openness on currency crisis. While higher loan-related 
financial openness increases the likelihood of currency crisis episodes, rising equity-related 
financial openness seems to reduce this probability. This result is consistent with the 
findings of Levchenko and Mauro (2006) where greater equity share in total liabilities may 
reduce the probability of sudden stops. 
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  35Appendix I: The Model 
We use the redux model (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995, 1996) as a general framework to 
generate inferences on the real exchange rate volatility. We consider a small country model 
with the non-traded sector being the locus of the monopoly and sticky price problems, and 
where the traded sector has a single homogeneous output that is priced in competitive 
world markets. Each representative agent of the Home country is endowed with a constant 
quantity of the traded good each period,  T y , and has a monopoly power over one of the 
non-tradables goods z  [0,1]. We assume that all agents have similar preferences 
throughout the world over a real consumption index and work effort. Given the symmetry 
in preferences and budget constraints across agents, we solve the optimization problem for 
the representative national consumer-producer. 
 
I.1 Set up 
The intertemporal utility function of the typical Home agent j is given by: 
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where (0,1), and , >0.
15 On the other hand, CT represents the consumption of traded 
goods, and CN is the composite consumption of non-traded goods:  
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In addition, P is the consumption-based price index (defined as the minimum cost of 
purchasing an additional unit of real consumption
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where pN(z) is the price of non-traded good z. Bonds are denominated in tradables, with r 
denoting the constant world net interest rate in tradables and (1+r) = 1. The typical 
household j’s period nominal budget constraint is: 
 
                                                           
15Disutility in producing more output is captured by the term -(/2)yN,s2. Assuming that disutility from effort 
N is given by - N and that yN=AN
 (<1), then  =2 / A 1/. The output term in equation (I.1) is 
obtained when  =0.5. A rise in productivity A is here captured by a fall in  (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996). 
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where Ft denotes real bonds (in units of the tradable good) that pay off a real return r, and 
t represents taxes per capita in terms of the tradable goods. Abstracting from government 
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where CN
A represents Home's aggregate consumption of non-traded goods. 
To solve the agent's optimization problem, we maximize equation (I.1) subject to 
equations (I.4) and (I.6). The solution for the paths of consumption (tradable and non-
tradable), money and work effort might meet the following first-order conditions: 
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Equation (I.7) reflects the Euler equation for optimal intertemporal consumption 
smoothing for traded goods. Note that the assumption (1+r) = 1 was instrumental in 
obtaining a traded version of Hall’s result. Equation (I.8) depicts the utility maximizing 
trade-off between spending on tradables in period t and a combination of one-period 
money holding and consumption spending in period t+1. Equation (I.9) states the marginal 
rate of substitution between traded and non-traded goods must be constant over time. 
Note that according to this condition, we can define the degree of openness as 
 
 N T T T
T T
C P C P
C P
. Finally, the equilibrium supply of non-tradables is presented in 
  37equation (I.10). This relationship establishes the condition for price-setting strategy for 
monopolistically competitive firms in the optimum.
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with the demand depending upon the consumption of tradables, changes in the price of 
tradables and changes in the real price of tradables. 
 
I.2. Approximate Solution 
Now we describe the steady state solution of this economy under the assumption that 
all prices are fully flexible and all our exogenous variables are constant. We first assume 
that the economy has zero initial net foreign assets. Given that the production of tradables 
is constant in this model at  T y , and the first-order condition of consumption smoothing in 
tradables, equation (I.7), we find that CT,t =  T y , for all t. Analogously, a symmetric 
equilibrium for the market of non-tradables implies that CN,t = yN,t(z) = CN,t
A, for all z non-
traded goods. 
Combining equations (I.9) and (I.10), we obtain the steady state level for the 
consumption and production of non-traded goods: 

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      (I.14) 
According to the model, prices in the competitive tradable sector are fully flexible, 
whereas prices in the monopolistic non-traded goods sector are set a period in advance 
                                                           
16 Hau (2002) interprets this condition as the marginal utility of an additional unit of non-traded consumption 
being equal to the marginal disutility of the production of an extra unit. According to this strategy, a mark-up 
of /(-1) is added by monopolistically competitive firms. 
  38(and they adjust only in period 2). Since there are no current account effects, money is 
neutral in the long run, and only nominal variables change across the steady state.  
In the short run, prices on non-traded goods are fixed at  ,0 N p  and the output of non-
traded goods is determined by demand. By symmetry across several domestic producers, 
we have that  ,0 N p  =  ,0 N P . The short run demand is given by   = CN.  
d
N y
If we combine equation (I.9), with the equilibrium in tradables, and the short-run 
demand for non-tradables, we find that the output and consumption of non-tradables can 












T       (I.15) 
 
I.3. Government in the Redux Model
17 
In the present section we include the government in the Obstfeld-Rogoff (1995, 1996) 
exchange rate redux model. Following Caselli (2001) we make the following assumptions 
about government consumption, Gt: (a) It is dissipative and it does not affect productivity, 
and (b) it is financed by non-distortionary taxes and seignorage. Hence, the government 









1        (I.16) 
We also assume that the government only demands the non-traded product. Now, the 

























) (       (I.17) 
where   and   represent the Home country's private and public demand for non-
traded goods. If we solve the optimization problem augmented by the government, only 


























                                                          
    (I.18) 
Note that, in equilibrium, total consumption —both private and public— must be equal to 
total output of non-traded goods. 
 
17 Alternative ways of modelling fiscal shocks are presented by Annicchiarico (2003), Balvers and Bergstrand 
(2002) and Sercu and Uppal (2000). 
  39Appendix II: Instrumenting Trade Openness  
Our outcome measure of trade openness is the real value of exports and imports as a 
percentage of GDP. Clearly, shocks to the RER can affect the level of trade openness and, 
hence, the OLS estimation of our regression equation may yield inconsistent coefficient 
estimates. To instrument for trade openness we will follow the identification strategy 
developed by Frankel and Romer (1999) and used in empirical work by Cavallo and 
Frankel (2007) and Cavallo (2007).  
We use the gravity equation model of bilateral trade where the trade between two 
countries depends positively on the size of the countries and inversely related to their 
distance.  A parsimonious specification of this model is: 
jk k j jk
j
jk jk S S D
GDP
m x








ln ln ln 3 2 1 0  
where xjk+mjk is bilateral trade (exports and imports) between countries j and k as a ratio to 
GDP of country j,   represents the distance between those countries, and   and   
are measures of country size. 
jk D j S k S
Our full specification includes geographical variables such as the distance between 
countries j and k, a variable that captures the number of landlocked countries in the pair, a 
dummy for countries sharing a border and a common language. Our size variables are the log of 
area and population for countries j and k. Following Frankel and Romer (1999) we also 
include interaction terms of all determinants of bilateral trade with the dummy of common 
border in order to identify geographic influences on overall trade.  
The final specification and the results for all non-overlapping 5-year periods of our data 
are reported in Table A.3.
18 Given the empirical success of gravity models, the results are 
the expected ones. That is, bilateral trade between countries j and k increases if the 
countries are closer in distance, they share a common border or they speak the same 
language, if they are larger in size (as measured by the population), and if they are not 
landlocked. 
The instrument for trade openness is constructed by aggregating the fited values from 
the gravity equation model of bilateral trade. If we assume that the specification of the 
model regressed in Table A.3 is  
                                                           
18 For the non-overlapping data set we run annual regressions of the gravity equation model —as specified in 
Table A.3.  We should remark that the results are qualitatively similar and although they are not reported in 
the paper, they are available from the authors upon request. 
  40jk k j
j











, ' ln   
where  is the vector of coefficient estimates in our gravity equation model, and Xj,k is the 
vector of explanatory variables (which includes geographic and interactions between size 
and geographic variables). Hence, we can estimate the geographic component of country j’s 





k j j X T , ' ˆ exp ˆ   
In sum, the geographic component of country j’s trade is the sum of estimated geographic 
components of its bilateral trade with other countries in the world. As in Frankel and 
Romer (1999) and Cavallo and Frankel (2007) we construct our instrument for trade 
openness not only for the countries covered in the bilateral trade data set but over all 
countries in the world —in effect, we have computed   for 147 countries. Our results 
find that the instrument is positively correlated with actual trade openness and that this 
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Real Exchange Rate Volatility and Openness: Statistics
Sample of 82 countries, 1975-2005 (5-year period observations)
All    By level of development By income level
Countries Industrial Developing High Middle Low
Volatility of the real effective exchange rate (REER), in logs
Std. Dev. 12-month REER variation 2.00 1.52 2.17 1.53 2.09 2.34
Std. Dev. 24-month REER variation 2.23 1.80 2.39 1.81 2.31 2.54
Std. Dev. 36-month REER variation 2.32 1.89 2.48 1.90 2.42 2.62
Std. Dev. 48-month REER variation 2.36 1.92 2.51 1.93 2.46 2.63
Std. Dev. 60-month REER variation 2.38 1.96 2.53 1.96 2.49 2.64
Fundamental Volatility (standard deviation, in logs)
Home-Foreign Productivity  Differentials 0.73 0.13 0.95 0.20 0.92 0.99
Fiscal Policy          1/ -3.12 -4.27 -2.70 -4.16 -2.94 -2.35
Monetary Policy     1/ -3.94 -4.52 -3.73 -4.49 -3.85 -3.51
Trade Openness (TO)
TO Policy Measure (Wacziarg-Welch)     2/ 0.71 0.98 0.58 0.97 0.63 0.45
Trade as % GDP, in logs 3.98 3.93 4.00 4.02 3.98 3.95
  - Trade in manufacturing goods 2.85 3.51 2.59 3.62 2.65 2.32
  - Trade in non-manufacturing goods 3.09 2.37 3.36 2.44 3.36 3.38
Financial Openness
Policy Measure:
  - IMF's capital account openness   3/ 0.33 0.60 0.23 0.59 0.28 0.15
  - Chinn-Ito measure of financial openness  4/ 0.18 1.53 -0.31 1.50 -0.19 -0.60
Outcome Measure:
 - Foreign Liabilities, % of GDP, in logs 4.31 4.40 4.27 4.44 4.22 4.29
    (i) Equity-related foreign liabilities 2.53 2.85 2.41 2.90 2.64 1.94
    (ii) Loan-related foreign liabilities 3.99 4.09 3.96 4.11 3.85 4.09
 - Foreign Assets & Liabilities, % of GDP, in logs 4.70 4.98 4.59 5.03 4.60 4.51
    (i) Equity-related foreign assets &  liabilities 2.78 3.48 2.52 3.52 2.76 2.00
    (ii) Loan-related foreign assets &  liabilities 4.45 4.66 4.37 4.70 4.32 4.36
Vulnerabilities
Output concentration (Herfindahl index) 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.22
Debt liabilities (% total liabilities, in logs) 4.30 4.29 4.30 4.28 4.23 4.42
Other Control Variables
Real income per capita (in logs) 7.73 9.76 6.99 9.74 7.60 5.92
CPI Inflation (in logs)        5/ 4.77 4.66 4.81 4.67 4.81 4.81
1/  Monetary and Fiscal Policy volatility are calculated using the methodology of Fatas and Mihov (2003, 2006). For fiscal policy volatility we regress government spending (as a ratio to GDP)
on output, lagged government spending and we instrument output growth with lagged output growth and current and lagged values of oil prices. The same methodology is applied to monetary policy
using the ratio of money supply to GDP. 2/ The policy measure of trade openness is the dummy of trade liberalization updated by Wacziarg and Welch (2003) from Sachs and Warner (1995).
It takes the value of 1 when the trade regime is considered "open". 3/ The IMF policy measure of financial openness is the dummy that takes the value of 1 whenever there are no restrictions on
capital account transactions, and 0 otherwise. The source fo the data is the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). 4/ The Chinn-Ito 
measures of financial openness is based on the binary dummy variables that codify the tabulation of restrictions on cross-border financial transactions reported by the IMF's AREAER (presence
of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on current account transactions, restrictions on capital account transactions and the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds). The aggregate index
is the fist standardized principal component of these 4 indicators. 5/The log of the CPI inflation rate is computed as: ln[(1+dp)*100], where dp is the log differences of the CPI index.  
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Real Exchange Rate Volatility and Openness: Panel Correlation Analysis
Sample panel correlation between real exchange rate volatility (12-month variation) with determinants
Sample of 82 countries, 1975-2005 (5-year period observations)
All   By level of development By income level
Countries Industrial Developing High Middle Low
Fundamental Volatility (standard deviation, in logs)
Home-Foreign Productivity  Differentials 0.43 0.49 0.29 0.44 0.32 0.26
Fiscal Policy          1/ 0.46 0.16 0.36 0.17 0.28 0.40
Monetary Policy     1/ 0.35 0.28 0.23 0.26 0.25 0.14
Trade Openness
Policy Measure     2/ -0.35 -0.10 -0.25 -0.21 -0.27 -0.13
Trade as % GDP, in logs -0.30 -0.41 -0.34 -0.35 -0.52 -0.04
  - In manufacturing goods -0.41 -0.50 -0.30 -0.43 -0.34 -0.16
  - In non-manufacturing 0.05 -0.20 -0.11 -0.18 -0.32 0.06
Financial Openness
Policy Measure:
  - IMF's capital account openness   3/ -0.24 -0.01 -0.17 -0.05 -0.16 -0.08
  - Chinn-Ito measure of financial openness  4/ -0.38 -0.12 -0.27 -0.17 -0.31 -0.12
Outcome Measure:
 - Foreign Liabilities, % of GDP, in logs -0.08 -0.29 0.00 -0.29 -0.22 0.28
    (i) Equity-related foreign liabilities -0.32 -0.26 -0.30 -0.29 -0.29 -0.23
    (ii) Loan-related foreign liabilities 0.01 -0.30 0.11 -0.28 -0.09 0.33
 - Foreign Assets & Liabilities, % of GDP, in logs -0.19 -0.31 -0.06 -0.32 -0.26 0.26
    (i) Equity-related foreign assets &  liabilities -0.36 -0.24 -0.30 -0.28 -0.27 -0.23
    (ii) Loan-related foreign assets &  liabilities -0.12 -0.32 0.01 -0.32 -0.19 0.30
Vulnerabilities
Output concentration (Herfindahl index) 0.16 -0.06 0.17 -0.12 0.04 0.22
Debt liabilities (% total liabilities, in logs) 0.23 0.05 0.28 0.13 0.25 0.21
Other Control Variables
Real income per capita (in logs) -0.36 0.01 -0.15 -0.02 0.12 -0.14
CPI Inflation (in logs)        5/ 0.55 0.33 0.55 0.31 0.52 0.59
We compute the pairwise correlation between the volatility of the real exchange rate and the different variables presented in the Table for different samples of countries.
For 1/, 2/, 3, 4/ and 5/ see footnote in Table 1.
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Openness and Real Exchange Rate Volatility: Basic Regression Analysis
Dependent Variable: Standard deviation of the 12-month variation in the real effective exchange rate (in logs)
Sample of 82 countries, 1975-2005 (5-year period observations)
Methodology: Least squares
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Trade Openness (TO)
Policy Measure  1/ 0.047 ..    ..    0.070 ..   
   Wacziarg and Welch measure (0.11)             (0.10)            
Real exports and imports ..    -0.266 ** -0.256 ** ..    -0.243 ** -0.232 **
   as % of GDP (in logs) (0.12)             (0.12)             (0.12)             (0.12)            
Financial Openness (FO)
Policy Measure  2/ -0.040 ..    ..    -0.032 ..   
   Chinn-Ito index (0.03)             (0.03)            
Foreign Liabilities ..    0.236 ** ..    ..    0.193 **
   as % of GDP (in logs) (0.08)             (0.08)            
Foreign Assets and Liabilities ..    ..    0.215 ** ..    ..    0.171 **
   as % of GDP (in logs) (0.09)             (0.08)            
Basic Controls
Fixed Exchange Rate Regime -0.429 ** -0.452 ** -0.438 ** -0.308 ** -0.309 ** -0.297 **
   (dummy variable) (0.11)             (0.11)             (0.11)             (0.11)             (0.11)             (0.11)            
Intermediate Exchange Rate Regime -0.430 ** -0.361 ** -0.360 ** -0.356 ** -0.285 ** -0.285 **
   (dummy variable) (0.10)             (0.10)             (0.10)             (0.09)             (0.09)             (0.09)            
Inflation 0.804 ** 0.645 ** 0.655 ** 0.668 ** 0.519 ** 0.526 **
   (CPI inflation rate, in logs) (0.11)             (0.10)             (0.10)             (0.11)             (0.09)             (0.10)            
Currency crisis   3/ 0.352 ** 0.497 ** 0.506 ** 0.270 ** 0.423 ** 0.430 **
   (Dummy = 1 when crisis occurs) (0.10)             (0.09)             (0.09)             (0.09)             (0.09)             (0.09)            
Income per capita -0.080 -0.246 * -0.276 ** -0.068 -0.248 ** -0.271 **
   (in logs) (0.16)             (0.13)             (0.13)             (0.15)             (0.12)             (0.12)            
Fundamental Volatility
Home-Foreign Productivity  Differential ..    ..    ..    0.177 ** 0.208 ** 0.207 **
(0.05)             (0.04)             (0.04)            
Monetary Policy     4/ ..    ..    ..    0.133 ** 0.122 ** 0.122 **
(0.04)             (0.04)             (0.04)            
Fiscal Policy          4/ ..    ..    ..    0.130 ** 0.122 ** 0.125 **
(0.04)             (0.04)             (0.04)            
Observations 426 479 479 425 476 476
R**2 0.699 0.693 0.691 0.736 0.731 0.729
Our basic regression equation includes a constant and accounts for country- and time-specific effects. Note that although the country dummies and time dummies are not reported, they
are available from the authors upon request. The numbers in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates are robust standard errors. * (**) implies statistical significance at 10 (5) % level.
1/ The policy measure of trade openness is the dummy of trade liberalization updated by Wacziarg and Welch (2003) from Sachs and Warner (1995). It takes the value of 1 when the
trade regime is considered "open". 2/ The Chinn-Ito measure of financial openness is based on the binary dummy variables that codify the tabulation of restrictions on cross-border financial
transactions reported by the IMF's AREAER (presence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on current account transactions, restrictions on capital account and the requirement of the
surrender of export proceeds). The aggregate index is the fist standardized principal component of these 4 indicators. 3/ The currency crisis variable is a binary dummy variable that takes
the value of 1 whenever there is a currency crisis. To define this episode we follow the Frankel and Romer (1996) methodology. 4/ Monetary and fiscal policy volatility are calculated using
using the methodology of Fatas and Mihov (2003, 2006). For fiscal policy volatility we regress government spending (as a ratio to GDP) on output, lagged government spending, and we
instrument output growth with lagged output growth and current and lagged values of oil prices. The same methodology is applied to monetary policy using the money supply to GDP ratio.  
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Openness and Real Exchange Rate Volatility: Instrumental Variables in the Basic Regression
Dependent Variable: Standard deviation of the 12-month variation in the real effective exchange rate (in logs)
Sample of 82 countries, 1975-2005 (5-year period observations)
Methodology: Instrumental Variables
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Trade Openness (TO)
Policy Measure  1/ -0.004 ..    ..    0.191 ..    ..   
   Wacziarg and Welch measure (0.22)             (0.19)            
Real exports and imports ..    -0.295 ** -0.371 ** ..    -0.229 ** -0.314 **
   as % of GDP (in logs) (0.08)             (0.11)             (0.09)             (0.11)            
Financial Openness (FO)
Policy Measure  2/ -0.201 ..    ..    -0.179 ..    ..   
   Chinn-Ito index (0.17)             (0.16)            
Foreign Liabilities ..    0.713 ** ..    ..    0.920 ** ..   
   as % of GDP (in logs) (0.26)             (0.27)            
Foreign Assets and Liabilities ..    ..    0.850 ** ..    ..    1.050 **
   as % of GDP (in logs) (0.30)             (0.32)            
Basic Controls
Fixed Exchange Rate Regime -0.319 * -0.453 ** -0.446 ** -0.217 -0.331 ** -0.319 **
   (dummy variable) (0.19)             (0.12)             (0.12)             (0.18)             (0.12)             (0.13)            
Intermediate Exchange Rate Regime -0.446 ** -0.180 * -0.108 -0.418 ** -0.061 0.020
   (dummy variable) (0.11)             (0.12)             (0.14)             (0.10)             (0.12)             (0.14)            
Inflation 0.689 ** 0.802 ** 0.811 ** 0.585 ** 0.623 ** 0.642 **
   (CPI inflation rate, in logs) (0.16)             (0.13)             (0.13)             (0.16)             (0.13)             (0.13)            
Currency crisis   3/ 0.335 ** 0.387 ** 0.382 ** 0.291 ** 0.284 ** 0.286 **
   (Dummy = 1 when crisis occurs) (0.12)             (0.11)             (0.12)             (0.11)             (0.12)             (0.12)            
Income per capita -0.270 -0.809 ** -0.940 ** -0.175 -0.845 ** -0.982 **
   (in logs) (0.19)             (0.21)             (0.24)             (0.19)             (0.22)             (0.25)            
Fundamental Volatility
Home-Foreign Productivity  Differential ..    ..    ..    0.189 ** 0.269 ** 0.271 **
(0.05)             (0.05)             (0.06)            
Monetary Policy     4/ ..    ..    ..    0.126 ** 0.089 * 0.084 *
(0.05)             (0.05)             (0.06)            
Fiscal Policy          4/ ..    ..    ..    0.122 ** 0.117 ** 0.116 **
(0.05)             (0.05)             (0.05)            
Observations 404 449 449 403 447 447
R**2 0.682 0.693 0.693 0.715 0.714 0.721
Our basic regression equation includes a constant and accounts for country- and time-specific effects. Note that although the country dummies and time dummies are not reported, they
are available from the authors upon request. The numbers in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates are robust standard errors. * (**) implies statistical significance at 10 (5) % level.
Our instrumental variable (IV) approach controls for the endogeneity of trade openness as well as financial openness. Our outcome measure of trade openness is instrumented using the
the gravity equation model as in Frankel and Romer (1999) and Cavallo and Frankel (2007). On the other hand, our outcome measure of financial openness is instrumented with the
origin of the country's legal system, initial value of natural resource abundance, institutional quality, concentration of exports, and other geographical and size factors following Faria,
Lane, Mauro and Milesi-Ferreti (2006). Finally, for 1/, 2/, 3/ and 4/, see footnote in Table 3.  
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Sensitivity Analysis I: Robustness across different samples, Instrumental Variables (IV)
Dependent Variable: Standard deviation of the 12-month variation in the real effective exchange rate (in logs)
Sample of 82 countries, 1975-2005 (5-year period observations)
Methodology: Instrumental Variables (accounting for country- and time-specifiic effects)
All By level of Development By Income Level Emerging
Countries Industrial Developing High Middle Low Markets
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Trade Openness (TO)
Real exports and imports -0.229 ** -0.073 -0.136 * 0.038 -0.142 -0.193 * -0.194 *
   as % of GDP (in logs) (0.09)             (0.10)             (0.07)             (0.17)             (0.11)             (0.12)             (0.12)             
Financial Openness (FO)
Foreign Liabilities 0.920 ** -0.129 0.778 ** -0.468 0.894 ** 0.704 ** 0.912 *
   as % of GDP (in logs) (0.27)             (0.34)             (0.21)             (0.69)             (0.41)             (0.27)             (0.47)             
Basic Controls
Fixed Exchange Rate Regime -0.331 ** -0.491 ** -0.074 -0.383 * -0.182 -0.088 -0.397 **
   (dummy variable) (0.12)             (0.15)             (0.15)             (0.22)             (0.22)             (0.25)             (0.19)             
Intermediate Exchange Rate Regime -0.061 -0.454 ** -0.178 -0.517 ** -0.370 ** 0.143 -0.373 **
   (dummy variable) (0.12)             (0.15)             (0.12)             (0.24)             (0.17)             (0.24)             (0.18)             
Inflation 0.623 ** 1.569 0.666 ** 0.050 0.508 ** 0.874 ** 0.214
   (CPI inflation rate, in logs) (0.13)             (1.19)             (0.13)             (0.50)             (0.16)             (0.22)             (0.16)             
Currency crisis   1/ 0.284 ** 0.187 0.303 ** 0.320 * 0.113 0.558 ** 0.114
   (Dummy = 1 when crisis occurs) (0.12)             (0.17)             (0.12)             (0.18)             (0.15)             (0.21)             (0.20)             
Income per capita -0.845 ** 0.059 -0.501 ** 0.079 -0.365 * -0.604 ** -0.665 **
   (in logs) (0.22)             (0.70)             (0.16)             (1.07)             (0.24)             (0.27)             (0.32)             
Fundamental Volatility
Home-Foreign Productivity  Differential 0.269 ** 0.054 0.274 ** 0.012 0.180 ** 0.400 ** 0.238 **
(0.05)             (0.07)             (0.06)             (0.09)             (0.08)             (0.09)             (0.09)             
Monetary Policy     2/ 0.089 * 0.082 0.086 0.030 0.105 0.106 0.047
(0.05)             (0.06)             (0.06)             (0.06)             (0.09)             (0.11)             (0.08)             
Fiscal Policy          2/ 0.117 ** 0.125 ** 0.126 ** 0.117 * 0.155 ** 0.156 0.110
(0.05)             (0.06)             (0.06)             (0.07)             (0.07)             (0.10)             (0.08)             
Observations 447 127 320 139 194 114 118
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R**2 0.615 0.594 0.569 0.592 0.533 0.525 0.570
Our basic regression equation includes a constant and accounts for country- and time-specific effects. Note that although the country dummies and time dummies are not reported, they are available from the 
authors upon request. The numbers in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates are robust standard errors. * (**) implies statistical significance at 10 (5) % level.
See footnote in Table 4 for the instrumentation and for the definition of currency crisis (1/) and fiscal and monetary policy volatility (2/).  
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Sensitivity Analysis II: Robustness to Changes in the Dependent Variable, Instrumental Variables (IV)
Dependent Variable: Standard deviation of the variation in the real effective exchange rate at different horizons (in logs)
Sample of 82 countries, 1975-2005 (5-year period observations)
Methodology: Instrumental Variables (accounting for country- and time-specifiic effects)
Standard Deviation of the changes in REER: Standard Deviation of the changes in REER:
12-month 24-month 36-month 48-month 60-month 12-month 24-month 36-month 48-month 60-month
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
Trade Openness (TO)
Real exports and imports -0.295 ** -0.262 ** -0.230 ** -0.098 -0.074 -0.229 ** -0.206 ** -0.186 ** -0.061 -0.056
   as % of GDP (in logs) (0.08)           (0.09)           (0.09)           (0.09)           (0.09)           (0.09)           (0.09)           (0.09)           (0.09)           (0.09)          
Financial Openness (FO)
Foreign Liabilities 0.713 ** 0.768 ** 0.835 ** 0.596 ** 0.711 ** 0.920 ** 0.948 ** 1.013 ** 0.774 ** 0.849 **
   as % of GDP (in logs) (0.26)           (0.28)           (0.28)           (0.28)           (0.28)           (0.27)           (0.29)           (0.30)           (0.29)           (0.30)          
Basic Controls
Fixed Exchange Rate Regime -0.453 ** -0.253 ** -0.127 -0.141 -0.138 -0.331 ** -0.144 -0.046 -0.065 -0.072
   (dummy variable) (0.12)           (0.13)           (0.13)           (0.13)           (0.13)           (0.12)           (0.13)           (0.13)           (0.13)           (0.13)          
Intermediate Exchange Rate Regime -0.180 * -0.114 0.009 0.005 0.114 -0.061 -0.008 0.097 0.092 0.191
   (dummy variable) (0.12)           (0.13)           (0.13)           (0.13)           (0.13)           (0.12)           (0.13)           (0.14)           (0.13)           (0.14)          
Inflation 0.802 ** 0.863 ** 0.850 ** 1.042 ** 1.084 ** 0.623 ** 0.703 ** 0.722 ** 0.930 ** 1.011 **
   (CPI inflation rate, in logs) (0.13)           (0.13)           (0.14)           (0.13)           (0.13)           (0.13)           (0.14)           (0.14)           (0.14)           (0.14)          
Currency crisis   1/ 0.387 ** 0.363 ** 0.303 ** 0.324 ** 0.188 * 0.284 ** 0.271 ** 0.216 * 0.246 ** 0.141
   (Dummy = 1 when crisis occurs) (0.11)           (0.12)           (0.12)           (0.12)           (0.12)           (0.12)           (0.12)           (0.13)           (0.12)           (0.13)          
Income per capita -0.809 ** -0.819 ** -0.842 ** -0.675 ** -0.571 ** -0.845 ** -0.840 ** -0.874 ** -0.721 ** -0.610 **
   (in logs) (0.21)           (0.22)           (0.23)           (0.22)           (0.22)           (0.22)           (0.23)           (0.24)           (0.23)           (0.24)          
Fundamental Volatility
Home-Foreign Productivity  Differential ..    ..    ..    ..    ..    0.269 ** 0.237 ** 0.231 ** 0.219 ** 0.158 **
(0.05)           (0.06)           (0.06)           (0.06)           (0.06)          
Monetary Policy     2/ ..    ..    ..    ..    ..    0.089 * 0.090 * 0.047 0.028 -0.007
(0.05)           (0.06)           (0.06)           (0.06)           (0.06)          
Fiscal Policy          2/ ..    ..    ..    ..    ..    0.117 ** 0.097 * 0.065 0.056 0.049
(0.05)           (0.05)           (0.05)           (0.05)           (0.05)          
Observations 449 449 449 449 449 447 447 447 447 447
R**2 0.693 0.653 0.657 0.644 0.636 0.714 0.665 0.676 0.665 0.647
Our basic regression equation includes a constant and accounts for country- and time-specific effects. Note that although the country dummies and time dummies are not reported, they are available from the authors upon request.
The numbers in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates are robust standard errors. * (**) implies statistical significance at 10 (5) % level.
Our instrumental variable (IV) approach controls for the endogeneity of trade openness as well as financial openness. Our outcome measure of trade openness is instrumented using the gravity equation model as in Frankel and Romer (1999),
and Cavallo and Frankel (2007). On the other hand, our outcome measure of financial openness is instrumented with the origin of the country's level system, initial values of natural resource abundance, institutional quality, concentration of
of exports, and other geographical and size factors following Faria, Lane, Mauro and Milesi-Ferreti (2006).  Finally, for 1/ and 2/, see footnote 3/ and 4/ in Table 3.
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Table 7
Openness, Vulnerabilities and Real Exchange Rate Volatility
Dependent Variable: Standard deviation of the 12-month variation in the real effective exchange rate (in logs)
Sample of 82 countries, 1975-2005 (5-year period observations)
Least Squares Instrumental Variables
Variables [ 1 ][ 2 ][ 3 ][ 4 ][ 5 ][ 6 ][ 7 ][ 8 ]
Trade Openness (TO)
TO: Real exports and imports -0.513 ** -0.402 * -0.480 ** -0.367 * -1.074 ** -0.836 ** -0.997 ** -0.706 *
   as % of GDP (in logs) (0.24)            (0.23)            (0.25)            (0.24)            (0.45)            (0.39)            (0.45)            (0.38)           
TO x Output Concentration 1.269 0.933 1.441 0.925 3.953 ** 3.039 ** 3.519 ** 2.404 *
(1.13)            (1.07)            (1.13)            (1.08)            (1.75)            (1.50)            (1.74)            (1.50)           
Output Concentration -2.355 -1.746 -2.974 -1.668 4.285 ** 3.251 ** 5.050 ** 4.367 **
   (Herfindahl index of output concentration) (3.85)            (3.64)            (3.86)            (3.68)            (1.76)            (1.54)            (1.87)            (1.62)           
Financial Openness (FO)
FO: Foreign Liabilities -1.366 * -0.870 -0.993 -0.759 -18.151 ** -13.695 ** -17.497 ** -12.865 **
   as % of GDP (in logs) (0.80)            (0.76)            (0.81)            (0.77)            (6.08)            (5.28)            (5.66)            (4.81)           
FO x Debt-Equity ratio 0.338 * 0.236 0.279 0.216 4.224 ** 3.211 ** 3.996 ** 2.924 **
(0.18)            (0.18)            (0.19)            (0.18)            (1.41)            (1.22)            (1.33)            (1.13)           
Debt-Equity ratio -0.952 -0.705 -0.933 -0.718 -18.094 ** -14.023 ** -15.039 ** -10.469 *
   (Debt liabilities as % of total liabilities) (0.81)            (0.77)            (0.81)            (0.77)            (6.52)            (5.61)            (6.69)            (5.69)           
Basic Controls
Fixed Exchange Rate Regime -0.365 ** -0.282 ** -0.415 ** -0.286 ** -0.422 ** -0.345 ** -0.220 -0.102
   (dummy variable) (0.11)            (0.11)            (0.12)            (0.11)            (0.18)            (0.15)            (0.24)            (0.20)           
Intermediate Exchange Rate Regime -0.371 ** -0.302 ** -0.376 ** -0.298 ** -0.622 ** -0.496 ** -0.534 ** -0.406 **
   (dummy variable) (0.10)            (0.09)            (0.10)            (0.10)            (0.18)            (0.16)            (0.19)            (0.16)           
Inflation 0.636 ** 0.498 ** 0.596 ** 0.488 ** 0.563 ** 0.523 ** 0.583 ** 0.504 **
   (CPI inflation rate, in logs) (0.10)            (0.10)            (0.10)            (0.10)            (0.18)            (0.16)            (0.17)            (0.15)           
Currency crisis   1/ 0.479 ** 0.417 ** 0.488 ** 0.421 ** 0.381 ** 0.353 ** 0.383 ** 0.348 **
   (Dummy = 1 when crisis occurs) (0.09)            (0.09)            (0.09)            (0.09)            (0.14)            (0.12)            (0.14)            (0.12)           
Income per capita -0.282 ** -0.224 * -0.212 * -0.209 * -0.276 -0.342 0.171 0.169
   (in logs) (0.13)            (0.12)            (0.13)            (0.13)            (0.30)            (0.26)            (0.44)            (0.38)           
Fundamental Volatility
Home-Foreign Productivity  Differential ..    0.201 ** ..    0.191 ** ..    0.208 ** ..    0.147 **
(0.04)            (0.05)            (0.07)            (0.07)           
Monetary Policy     2/ ..    0.117 ** ..    0.116 ** ..    0.099 * ..    0.143 **
(0.04)            (0.04)            (0.06)            (0.07)           
Fiscal Policy          2/ ..    0.121 ** ..    0.122 ** ..    0.080 ..    0.117 *
(0.04)            (0.04)            (0.06)            (0.06)           
Observations 467 464 467 464 432 430 432 430
Time Dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R**2 0.430 0.465 0.702 0.735 0.268 0.330 0.385 0.552
Our basic regression equation includes a constant and accounts for country- and time-specific effects. Note that although the country dummies and time dummies are not reported, they are available from the authors upon
request. The numbers in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates are robust standard errors. * (**) implies statistical significance at 10 (5) % level.
See footnote in Table 6 for the instrumentation procedure as well as the definition of variables 1/ and 2/  
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Composition Effects of Openness on Real Exchange Rate Volatility
Dependent Variable: Standard deviation of the 12-month variation in the real effective exchange rate (in logs)
Sample of 82 countries, 1975-2005 (5-year period observations)
Least Squares Instrumental Variables
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade in Manufacturing Goods -0.130 * -0.132 ** -0.122 * -0.126 * -0.499 ** -0.441 ** -0.369 * -0.348 *
   as % of GDP (in logs) (0.07)            (0.06)            (0.07)            (0.06)            (0.20)            (0.19)            (0.20)            (0.19)           
Trade in Non-Manufacturing Goods 0.018 0.030 0.016 0.029 -0.043 -0.038 -0.065 -0.069
   as % of GDP (in logs) (0.09)            (0.09)            (0.09)            (0.09)            (0.28)            (0.25)            (0.28)            (0.25)           
Financial Openness (FO)
Equity-related Liabilities  -0.052 -0.057 ..    ..    -0.186 -0.045 ..    ..   
   as % of GDP (in logs) (0.05)            (0.05)            (0.14)            (0.13)           
Loan-related Liabilities  0.233 ** 0.206 ** ..    ..    1.232 ** 1.009 ** ..    ..   
   as % of GDP (in logs) (0.07)            (0.07)            (0.31)            (0.28)           
Equity-related Assets and Liabilities  ..    ..    -0.051 -0.059 ..    ..    -0.356 ** -0.190
   as % of GDP (in logs) (0.05)            (0.05)            (0.16)            (0.15)           
Loan-related Assets and Liabilities  ..    ..    0.213 ** 0.184 ** ..    ..    1.368 ** 1.156 **
   as % of GDP (in logs) (0.09)            (0.09)            (0.40)            (0.37)           
Basic Controls
Fixed Exchange Rate Regime -0.421 ** -0.283 ** -0.420 ** -0.281 ** -0.260 * -0.225 * -0.226 * -0.191
   (dummy variable) (0.11)            (0.11)            (0.11)            (0.11)            (0.15)            (0.14)            (0.15)            (0.13)           
Intermediate Exchange Rate Regime -0.330 ** -0.250 ** -0.338 ** -0.258 ** 0.013 0.009 0.043 0.041
   (dummy variable) (0.10)            (0.09)            (0.10)            (0.09)            (0.15)            (0.13)            (0.16)            (0.14)           
Inflation 0.845 ** 0.694 ** 0.857 ** 0.706 ** 0.551 ** 0.481 ** 0.575 ** 0.488 **
   (CPI inflation rate, in logs) (0.11)            (0.11)            (0.11)            (0.11)            (0.18)            (0.16)            (0.18)            (0.16)           
Currency crisis   1/ 0.471 ** 0.397 ** 0.473 ** 0.399 ** 0.299 ** 0.274 ** 0.322 ** 0.285 **
   (Dummy = 1 when crisis occurs) (0.09)            (0.09)            (0.09)            (0.09)            (0.13)            (0.12)            (0.13)            (0.12)           
Income per capita -0.103 -0.074 -0.122 -0.089 -0.092 -0.121 -0.206 -0.229
   (in logs) (0.15)            (0.14)            (0.15)            (0.14)            (0.22)            (0.20)            (0.22)            (0.20)           
Fundamental Volatility
Home-Foreign Productivity  Differential ..    0.192 ** ..    0.196 ** ..    0.189 ** ..    0.188 **
(0.04)            (0.04)            (0.05)            (0.05)           
Monetary Policy     2/ ..    0.131 ** ..    0.130 ** ..    0.124 ** ..    0.126 **
(0.04)            (0.04)            (0.05)            (0.05)           
Fiscal Policy          2/ ..    0.138 ** ..    0.138 ** ..    0.123 ** ..    0.125 **
(0.04)            (0.04)            (0.05)            (0.05)           
Observations 461 458 461 458 441 439 441 439
R**2 0.696 0.738 0.692 0.735 0.613 0.629 0.646 0.586
Our basic regression equation includes a constant and accounts for country- and time-specific effects. Note that although the country dummies and time dummies are not reported, they are available from the authors upon
request. The numbers in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates are robust standard errors. * (**) implies statistical significance at 10 (5) % level.
See footnote in Table 6 for the instrumentation procedure as well as the definition of variables 1/ and 2/  
  49Table 9
Openness and Real Exchange Rate Volatility in "Turbulent Times"
Dependent Variable: Incidence of real exchange rate drops or currency crisis
Sample of 82 countries, 1975-2005 (annual observations)
Estimation: Probit (accounting for fixed and time-effects)
Real Exchange Rate Drops   1/ Currency Crises   2/
LS LS IV IV LS LS IV IV
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Trade Openness (TO)
Real exports and imports  -0.376 ** -0.274 * 0.008 0.007 -0.525 ** -0.420 ** -0.059 -0.056
   as % of GDP (in logs) (0.16)            (0.16)            (0.04)            (0.04)            (0.16)            (0.17)            (0.04)            (0.04)           
Financial Openness (FO)
Foreign Liabilities 0.220 * ..    0.057 ..    0.352 ** ..    0.140
   as % of GDP (in logs) (0.13)            (0.11)            (0.13)            (0.11)           
Foreign Assets and Liabilities ..    0.051 ..    -0.067 ..    0.169 -0.008
   as % of GDP (in logs) (0.13)            (0.11)            (0.13)            (0.11)           
Domestic Controls
Economic Growth -1.641 -1.893 -2.063 -2.146 -1.751 -1.878 * -1.987 * -2.025 *
   (log differences of real GDP per capita) (1.50)            (1.48)            (1.47)            (1.46)            (1.19)            (1.18)            (1.16)            (1.15)           
Ratio of Reserves to Imports -0.172 ** -0.202 ** -0.168 ** -0.185 ** -0.226 ** -0.262 ** -0.203 ** -0.216 **
   (in logs) (0.08)            (0.07)            (0.08)            (0.07)            (0.08)            (0.08)            (0.08)            (0.07)           
Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation 0.515 ** 0.498 ** 0.526 ** 0.504 ** 1.166 ** 1.073 ** 1.033 ** 0.930 **
   (Index in logs) (0.15)            (0.16)            (0.16)            (0.16)            (0.31)            (0.31)            (0.29)            (0.28)           
Inflation 0.285 ** 0.328 ** 0.387 ** 0.396 ** 0.400 ** 0.441 ** 0.492 ** -0.628 **
   (CPI inflation rate, in logs) (0.13)            (0.13)            (0.12)            (0.12)            (0.12)            (0.12)            (0.12)            (0.17)           
Fixed Exchange Rate Regime -0.365 * -0.352 * -0.367 * -0.348 * -0.626 ** -0.624 ** -0.645 ** 0.524 **
   (Dummy variable) (0.19)            (0.19)            (0.19)            (0.19)            (0.18)            (0.18)            (0.17)            (0.12)           
External Shocks
Terms of trade shocks -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
   (log differences of terms of trade index) (0.01)            (0.01)            (0.01)            (0.01)            (0.00)            (0.00)            (0.00)            (0.00)           
Terms of trade shocks, Lagged -0.013 ** -0.013 ** -0.013 ** -0.013 ** -0.010 ** -0.010 ** -0.011 ** -0.011 **
(0.01)            (0.01)            (0.01)            (0.01)            (0.00)            (0.00)            (0.00)            (0.00)           
International interest rate 4.077 3.508 3.823 3.295 10.803 ** 9.928 ** 10.292 ** 9.335 **
   (Prime rate in real terms, in logs) (6.24)            (6.20)            (6.22)            (6.18)            (4.74)            (4.70)            (4.69)            (4.64)           
International interest rate, Lagged -8.135 -6.989 -7.244 -6.309 -14.259 ** -12.687 ** -13.060 ** -11.530 **
(5.63)            (5.60)            (5.60)            (5.55)            (4.50)            (4.46)            (4.45)            (4.38)           
Growth in external demand 0.035 0.040 0.038 0.042 -0.084 ** -0.076 ** -0.073 ** -0.067 *
   (log differences of real GDP of trading partners) (0.05)            (0.05)            (0.05)            (0.05)            (0.04)            (0.04)            (0.04)            (0.04)           
Growth in external demand, Lagged -0.096 ** -0.097 ** -0.095 ** -0.096 ** -0.079 ** -0.079 ** -0.074 ** -0.074 **
(0.05)            (0.05)            (0.05)            (0.05)            (0.04)            (0.04)            (0.04)            (0.04)           
C o u n t r i e s 7 97 97 97 97 97 97 97
Observations 1875 1875 1875 1875 1875 1875 1875 1875
Pseudo-R2 0.338 0.334 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.325 0.322 0.321
Our basic regression equation includes a constant and accounts for country- and time-specific effects. Note that although the country dummies and time dummies are not reported, they are available from the authors upon
request. The numbers in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates are robust standard errors. * (**) implies statistical significance at 10 (5) % level.
Our instrumental variable (IV) approach controls for the endogeneity of trade openness as well as financial openness. Our outcome measure of trade openness is instrumented using the gravity equation model as in Frankel
and Romer (1999) and Cavallo and Frankel (2007). On the other hand, our outcome measure of financial openness is instrumented with the origin of the country's legal system, initial values of natural resource abundance,
institutional quality, concentration of exports, and other geographical and size factors following Faria, Lane, Mauro and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). Finally, for 1/ and 2/ see footnote in Table 5.
1/ We define an episode of real exchange rate drop whenever the real effective exchange rate depreciates by more than 25%. 2/ Our definition of currency crisis follows the methodology in Frankel and Rose (1996).
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  50Table 10
Composition Effects of Openness and Real Exchange Rate Volatility in "Turbulent Times"
Dependent Variable: Incidence of real exchange rate drops or currency crisis 
Sample of 82 countries, 1975-2005 (annual observations)
Estimation: Probit (accounting for fixed and time-effects)
Real Exchange Rate Drops   1/ Currency Crises   2/
LS LS IV IV LS LS IV IV
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade in manufacturing goods -0.212 ** -0.197 ** -0.141 ** -0.136 ** -0.205 ** -0.175 ** -0.095 ** -0.086 **
   as % of GDP (in logs) (0.06)            (0.06)            (0.04)            (0.04)            (0.07)            (0.07)            (0.05)            (0.04)           
Trade in non-manufacturing goods 0.034 0.046 0.223 ** 0.211 ** -0.068 -0.043 0.093 0.078
   as % of GDP (in logs) (0.09)            (0.08)            (0.06)            (0.06)            (0.09)            (0.09)            (0.07)            (0.06)           
Financial Openness (FO)
Equity-related Foreign Liabilities -0.115 ** ..    -0.114 ** ..    -0.169 ** ..    -0.190 ** ..   
   as % of GDP (in logs) (0.06)            (0.06)            (0.07)            (0.07)           
Loan-related Foreign Liabilities 0.230 * ..    0.186 * ..    0.483 ** ..    0.415 ** ..   
   as % of GDP (in logs) (0.12)            (0.11)            (0.14)            (0.14)           
Equity-related Foreign Assets and Liabilities ..    -0.126 ** ..    -0.118 ** ..    -0.181 ** ..    -0.188 **
   as % of GDP (in logs) (0.06)            (0.06)            (0.07)            (0.07)           
Loan-related Foreign Assets and Liabilities ..    0.164 ..    0.112 ..    0.363 ** ..    0.293 **
   as % of GDP (in logs) (0.13)            (0.12)            (0.15)            (0.14)           
Domestic Controls
Economic Growth -0.994 -1.062 -1.373 -1.410 -1.609 -1.681 -1.782 -1.816 *
   (log differences of real GDP per capita) (1.46)            (1.44)            (1.45)            (1.44)            (1.20)            (1.18)            (1.19)            (1.18)           
Ratio of Reserves to Imports -0.102 -0.135 ** -0.110 -0.141 ** -0.157 * -0.213 ** -0.148 * -0.196 **
   (in logs) (0.07)            (0.07)            (0.07)            (0.07)            (0.08)            (0.08)            (0.08)            (0.08)           
Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation 0.519 ** 0.511 ** 0.545 ** 0.530 ** 1.280 ** 1.180 ** 1.248 ** 1.135 **
   (Index in logs) (0.15)            (0.15)            (0.15)            (0.15)            (0.32)            (0.32)            (0.32)            (0.31)           
Inflation 0.298 ** 0.321 ** 0.360 ** 0.375 ** 0.386 ** 0.435 ** 0.416 ** 0.464 **
   (CPI inflation rate, in logs) (0.13)            (0.12)            (0.12)            (0.12)            (0.13)            (0.13)            (0.13)            (0.13)           
Fixed Exchange Rate Regime -0.363 * -0.373 ** -0.393 ** -0.395 ** -0.627 ** -0.649 ** -0.636 ** -0.654 **
   (Dummy variable) (0.19)            (0.19)            (0.19)            (0.19)            (0.18)            (0.18)            (0.18)            (0.18)           
External Shocks
Terms of trade shocks -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
   (log differences of terms of trade index) (0.00)            (0.00)            (0.00)            (0.00)            (0.00)            (0.00)            (0.00)            (0.00)           
Terms of trade shocks, Lagged -0.012 ** -0.012 ** -0.012 ** -0.012 ** -0.011 ** -0.011 ** -0.011 ** -0.011 **
(0.01)            (0.01)            (0.01)            (0.01)            (0.00)            (0.00)            (0.00)            (0.00)           
International interest rate 3.164 2.764 3.301 2.872 10.653 ** 9.687 ** 10.645 ** 9.635 **
   (Prime rate in real terms, in logs) (6.28)            (6.23)            (6.30)            (6.25)            (4.87)            (4.79)            (4.86)            (4.77)           
International interest rate, Lagged -6.886 -6.193 -6.751 -6.134 -14.938 ** -13.322 ** -14.467 ** -12.926 **
(5.60)            (5.55)            (5.60)            (5.55)            (4.62)            (4.53)            (4.60)            (4.50)           
Growth in external demand 0.027 0.029 0.025 0.027 -0.090 ** -0.084 ** -0.087 ** -0.081 **
   (log differences of real GDP of trading partners) (0.04)            (0.04)            (0.05)            (0.04)            (0.04)            (0.04)            (0.04)            (0.04)           
Growth in external demand, Lagged -0.090 ** -0.093 ** -0.099 ** -0.101 ** -0.070 * -0.072 * -0.069 * -0.071 *
(0.04)            (0.04)            (0.05)            (0.05)            (0.04)            (0.04)            (0.04)            (0.04)           
C o u n t r i e s 7 97 97 97 97 97 97 97
Observations 1834 1834 1834 1834 1834 1834 1834 1834
Pseudo-R2 0.363 0.362 0.364 0.363 0.350 0.344 0.346 0.342
See footnote in Table 9.
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Sample of Countries
Latin America and the Caribbean
ARG Argentina ECU Ecuador PAN Panama
BOL Bolivia GTM Guatemala PER Peru
BRA Brazil HND Honduras PRY Paraguay
CHL Chile HTI Haiti SLV El Salvador
COL Colombia JAM Jamaica TTO Trinidad and Tobago
CRI Costa Rica MEX Mexico URY Uruguay
DOM Dominican Republic NIC Nicaragua VEN Venezuela
East Asia and the Pacific
CHN China MYS Malaysia SGP Singapore
IDN Indonesia PHL Philippines THA Thailand
KOR Korea, Rep. PNG Papua New Guinea
Industrial Economies
AUS Australia ESP Spain JPN Japan
AUT Austria FIN Finland NLD Netherlands
BEL Belgium-Luxembourg FRA France NOR Norway
CAN Canada GBR United Kingdom NZL New Zealand
CHE Switzerland GRC Greece PRT Portugal
DEU Germany IRL Ireland SWE Sweden
DNK Denmark ISL Iceland USA United States
ITA Italy
Middle East and North Africa
EGY Egypt, Arab Rep. JOR Jordan TUN Tunisia
IRN Iran, Islamic Rep. MAR Morocco TUR Turkey
ISR Israel SYR Syrian Arab Republic
South Asia
BGD Bangladesh IND India PAK Pakistan
LKA Sri Lanka
Sub-Saharan Africa
BFA Burkina Faso KEN Kenya SLE Sierra Leone
BWA Botswana MDG Madagascar TGO Togo
CIV Cote d'Ivoire MWI Malawi ZAF South Africa
GHA Ghana NER Niger ZMB Zambia
GMB Gambia, The NGA Nigeria ZWE Zimbabwe
SEN Senegal  
  52Table A.2
Definitions and Sources of Variables Used in Regression Analysis
Variable Definition and Construction Source
Real effective exchange rate 
(REER)
Multilateral real exchange rate index (trade-weighted), monthly 
observations.
Authors' construction using the IMF's International 
Financial Statistics.
Real Exchange Rate Volatility Standard Deviation of the annual (12-month) changes in the Real
Effective Exchange Rate (in logs)
Authors' construction using the IMF's International 
Financial Statistics
GDP Real Gross Domestic Product. GDP is in 1985 PPP-adjusted US$.  Authors' construction using Summers and Heston 
(1991) and The World Bank's World Development 
Indicators
Growth Rate in GDP Log differences of Real GDP.  Authors' construction using Summers and Heston 
(1991) and The World Bank's World Development 
Indicators
Trade Openness: Policy Measure Average years of trade openness according to Sachs and Warner 
criteria.
Sachs and Warner (1995), Wacziarg and Welch (2003).
Trade Openness: Outcome 
Measure
Exports and imports (in 1995 US$) as a percentage of GDP (in 1995 
US$).
The World Bank's World Development Indicators.
Trade in Manufacturing Goods Exports and imports in manufacturing goods (in 1995 US$) as a 
percentage of GDP (in 1995 US$).
The World Bank's World Development Indicators and 
UN COMTRADE.
Trade in Non-Manufacturing 
Goods
Exports and imports in non-manufacturing goods (in 1995 US$) as a 
percentage of GDP (in 1995 US$).
The World Bank's World Development Indicators and 
UN COMTRADE.
Financial Openness: Policy 
Measure 1
Average years of absence of controls on capital account transactions 
during the corresponding 5-year period.
IMF's Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (Various Issues), and Prasad, Rogoff, Wei 
and Kose (2003).
Financial Openness: Policy 
Measure 2
First principal component of indicators of absence of resrtictions in 
cross-border transactions: multiple exchange rates, current account 
and capital account transactions, and surrender of export proceeds.
IMF's Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (Various Issues), and Chinn and Ito (2006)
Financial Openness: Outcome 
Measure
The stock of: (a) Foreign Assets and Liabilities as % of GDP (in 
logs), and (b) Foreign Liabilities as % of GDP (in logs).
Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2001, 2006).
Financial Openness: Composition We use both the equity-related foreign liabilities and foreign assets 
and liabilities as % of GDP (portfolio equity and FDI) as well as the 
ratio of loan-related foreign liabilities and foreign assets and liabilities 
to GDP.
Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2001, 2006).
Dummy for Fixed Exchange 
Rates
Takes the value of 1 for arrangements such as full dollarization, 
currency boards, and de facto pegs.
Author’s calculations with data from Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004)
Dummy for Intermediate 
Exchange Rates
Takes the value of 1 for crawling pegs. Author’s calculations with data from Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004)
Dummy for Flexible Exchange 
Rates
Takes the value of 1 for managed and free floating schemes. Author’s calculations with data from Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004)
Volatility of Productivity Shocks Standard deviation of the log difference of real GDP per worker of
the countries and its main trading partners.
Authors' construction using Summers and Heston 
(1991) and The World Bank's World Development 
Indicators
Volatility of Fiscal Policy Standard Deviation of the discretionary measure of fiscal policy
(general government consumption). This measure was obtained
using the methodology in Fatas and Mihov (2003, 2006)
Authors' construction using the World Bank's World 
Development Indicators, and International Monetary 
Fund's International Financial Statistics
Volatility of Monetary Policy Standard Deviation of the discretionary measure of monetary policy.
This measure was obtained using the methodology in Fatas and
Mihov (2003, 2006)
Authors' construction using International Monetary 
Fund's International Financial Statistics
Terms of Trade Net barter terms of trade index (1995=100) The World Bank's World Development Indicators.
Terms of Trade Changes Log differences of the terms of trade index Authors' construction using The World Bank's World 
Development Indicators.
Volatility of Terms of Trade 
Changes
Standard deviation of the log difference of the terms of trade. Authors' construction using The World Bank's World 
Development Indicators.
Period-specific Shifts Time dummy variables. Authors’ construction.
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Constructing the Trade Instrument: Gravity model of bilateral trade
Dependent Variable: Bilateral trade (exports and imports) in the country pair (j,k) as a ratio of country j's GDP (in logs)
Sample of 82 countries, 1975-2005 (annual observations)
Variable 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-00 2001-05
Border 10.645 * 12.350 * 10.335 * 13.233 ** 16.974 ** 17.269 **
 (dummy=1 of country pair share border) (6.92)            (6.97)            (6.86)            (6.68)            (6.09)            (6.13)           
Distance  (in logs) -2.027 ** -1.919 ** -1.730 ** -1.878 ** -1.840 ** -1.869 **
 (great circle distance between pair in km.) (0.11)            (0.10)            (0.09)            (0.09)            (0.08)            (0.08)           
Distance x Border 1.647 2.466 * 2.840 ** 2.197 * 1.645 * 1.622
(1.34)            (1.31)            (1.28)            (1.23)            (1.09)            (1.08)           
Landlocked -1.670 ** -1.679 ** -1.664 ** -1.622 ** -1.367 ** -1.774 **
(number of landlocked countries in pair) (0.17)            (0.16)            (0.15)            (0.14)            (0.11)            (0.12)           
Landlocked x Border 0.826 0.951 0.966 0.780 0.553 1.082 *
(0.72)            (0.71)            (0.70)            (0.66)            (0.55)            (0.56)           
Country j's population 0.897 ** 0.725 ** 0.663 ** 0.655 ** 0.614 ** 0.604 **
(number of inhabitants, initial value, in logs) (0.06)            (0.05)            (0.05)            (0.05)            (0.04)            (0.05)           
Country j's population x Border -0.666 * -0.320 -0.676 -0.629 -0.693 * -0.633 *
(0.44)            (0.45)            (0.46)            (0.43)            (0.39)            (0.39)           
Country k's population 1.720 ** 1.742 ** 1.681 ** 1.647 ** 1.589 ** 1.618 **
(number of inhabitants, initial value, in logs) (0.05)            (0.05)            (0.05)            (0.05)            (0.04)            (0.04)           
Country k's population x Border -0.808 * -0.801 * -0.461 -0.629 -0.647 * -0.624 *
(0.46)            (0.46)            (0.48)            (0.43)            (0.40)            (0.40)           
Country j's area -0.659 ** -0.545 ** -0.545 ** -0.415 ** -0.406 ** -0.362 **
(surface area in sq. km., in logs) (0.05)            (0.04)            (0.04)            (0.04)            (0.04)            (0.04)           
Country j's area x Border 0.304 -0.480 -0.226 -0.365 -0.215 -0.314
(0.52)            (0.51)            (0.52)            (0.49)            (0.45)            (0.45)           
Country k's area -0.514 ** -0.429 ** -0.467 ** -0.375 ** -0.362 ** -0.338 **
(surface area in sq. km., in logs) (0.04)            (0.04)            (0.04)            (0.04)            (0.04)            (0.04)           
Country k's area x Border -0.176 -0.313 -0.563 -0.180 -0.199 -0.241
(0.57)            (0.57)            (0.57)            (0.52)            (0.48)            (0.48)           
Common language 1.301 ** 1.216 ** 1.254 ** 1.378 ** 1.002 ** 0.997 **
 (dummy=1 of country pair share language) (0.20)            (0.18)            (0.18)            (0.16)            (0.15)            (0.15)           
Constant -20.281 ** -21.666 ** -20.879 ** -21.450 ** -20.073 ** -20.699 **
(1.29)            (1.16)            (1.12)            (1.04)            (0.93)            (0.95)           
Number of observations 5212 6198 6436 6762 7340 6976
R**2 0.2765 0.2681 0.2596 0.2867 0.2974 0.3105
Correlation with dependent variable 0.53 0.52 0.51 0.54 0.55 0.56
 
 
  54Figure 1
Trade Openness and Real Exchange Rate Volatility
Trade Openness vs. RER Volatility
















































Trade in Manufacturing vs. REER Volatility
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Trade in Non-Manufacturing vs. REER Volatility
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Output Concentration vs. REER Volatility











0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5










































  55Figure 2
Financial Openness and Real Exchange Rate Volatility
Foreign Liabilities vs. REER Volatility
















































Foreign Assets and Liabilities vs. REER Volatility
















































Equity-related Foreign Liabilities vs. REER Volatility
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Loan-related foreign liabilities vs. REER Volatility
















































Equity-related foreign assets and liabilities vs. REER Volatility
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Loan-related foreign assets and liabilities vs. REER Volatility

















































  56Figure 3
Trade Openness and Real Exchange Rate Volatility
Sample of non-overlapping 5-year period observations
3.1 RER Volatility response to higher trade openness conditional on output concentration
3.1.1 Regression [7] of Table 7 3.1.2 Regression [8] of Table 7
3.2 RER Volatility response to rising output concentration conditional on trade openness
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  57Figure 4
RER Volatility Response to Higher Financial Openness
conditional on the share of debt in total liabilities
Sample of non-overlapping 5-year period observations
4.1 Regression [7] of Table 7
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